



Security Council

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Letter dated 26 October 2017 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey herewith the seventh report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) António Guterres

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**Please see Annotated
Pages 21 to 40
for Detailed Technical Comments on the
Technical Findings Reported to the
UN Security Council by the
OPCW Leadership Panel**

Also see Attachment at the End of This Annotated Document
(After Page 40)

**Forensic Evidence Cited by the OPCW that
Contradict Its Reported Analysis and Conclusions**

Page 1
of
Annotated
Full Report

Annex

Letter dated 26 October 2017 from the Leadership Panel of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism addressed to the Secretary-General

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons -United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has the honour to transmit its seventh report pursuant to Security Council resolutions [2235 \(2015\)](#) and [2319 \(2016\)](#) (see enclosure).

(Signed) Edmond Mulet
Head Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism

(Signed) Judy Cheng-Hopkins
Leadership Panel

(Signed) Stefan Mogl
Leadership Panel

Enclosure

Seventh report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism

S/2017/904

I. Introduction

1. The seventh report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions [2235 \(2015\)](#) and [2319 \(2016\)](#). It covers the period from 23 June 2017, when the sixth report of the Mechanism (see [S/2017/552](#)) was submitted to the Council, to 25 October 2017.

II. Background

2. As set forth in resolutions [2235 \(2015\)](#) and [2319 \(2016\)](#), the **mandate of the Mechanism is to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups or Governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic** where the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic determines or has determined that a specific incident in that country involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical. In accordance with resolution [2319 \(2016\)](#), **the mandate of the Mechanism will come to an end on 16 November 2017.**
3. **The Mechanism consists of an independent three-member panel together with a core staff of professionals selected on the basis of their expertise**, taking into account geographical diversity and the equal participation of women and men. **The Mechanism is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, Edmond Mulet**, with overall responsibility, and **two deputies with responsibilities for investigative and political matters**, respectively. Those three positions constitute the Leadership Panel of the Mechanism.
4. The Head of the Mechanism has continued to be supported by three components: the Investigative Office, the Political Office and the Planning and Operations Support Office. **The Investigative Office is based in The Hague, Netherlands**, and comprises two units: the Information Collection Unit and the Analysis and Corroboration Unit. **The Political Office is based in New York**, with a liaison officer in Damascus, and provides, inter alia, political analysis, legal advice, liaison, and **media and information management support**. **The Planning and Operations Support Office is based in New York and provides administrative, logistical and planning support to the political and investigative components.**
5. While the **OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic works to establish the facts** surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes in the country, it is not mandated to reach conclusions about attributing responsibility for chemical weapons use.¹ Following a determination by the Fact-Finding Mission that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, the Mechanism conducts an investigation to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, the perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or those otherwise involved. In conducting its investigation, **the Mechanism relies on findings of the Fact-Finding Mission regarding the use of chemicals as weapons in each incident and pursues a rigorous independent**

¹ See [S/2014/533](#), para. 14, and resolution [2235 \(2015\)](#), eighth preambular para.

examination of the available information surrounding such use so as to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, those responsible.

6. As indicated in the sixth report of the Mechanism, the position of the Leadership Panel remains that, if new information is provided regarding the four cases initially referred to in the third and fourth reports of the Mechanism (see S/2016/738/Rev.1 and S/2016/888), supplementary investigations may be undertaken. For the present report, the Mechanism focused on incidents that had occurred at Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016 and at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.

III. Methods of work

7. The Mechanism is committed to the principles of impartiality, objectivity and independence in carrying out its work. The Mechanism continued to implement its mandate in accordance with the methods of work outlined in its previous reports, including in annex I to its third report (see S/2016/738/Rev.1). There are two main phases of the work of the Mechanism. During the first phase (information collection and planning for case development), the Mechanism reviews and analyses data, collects relevant information and creates a preliminary investigation plan. Following a decision by the Leadership Panel to conduct an in-depth investigation into a particular incident, the Mechanism requests full access to the information obtained or prepared by the Fact-Finding Mission.
8. The second phase (case investigation) commences thereafter, beginning with the preparation of an in-depth investigation plan, which includes the consideration of possible scenarios. During this phase, the Mechanism conducts detailed analysis of the information obtained by the Fact-Finding Mission and collects additional information from other sources, including its field missions. This work continues until the Mechanism is satisfied that it has gathered and assessed all of the information and evidence that it can reasonably obtain and, on that basis, presents its findings to the Security Council.
9. As an investigative mechanism without judicial powers, the Mechanism cannot compel the submission of information or documents to it, but relies on the voluntary cooperation of witnesses and those in possession of relevant information. In obtaining information and conducting analysis and assessment thereof, the Mechanism complied with the relevant terms of reference approved by the Security Council (see S/2015/669 and S/2015/697) and carried out its work in an independent and impartial manner. At all times, it was guided by the highest professional standards.
10. In preparing the investigation plan for each case, the Mechanism outlined a series of possible scenarios, including those put forward by Member States, based on all available information as to how the incidents might have occurred.
11. In conducting its investigations into the incidents at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun, the Mechanism undertook the following key activities: (a) obtaining and reviewing information and material from the Fact-Finding Mission; (b) collecting information from open sources; (c) submitting requests to Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, for information; (d) interviewing witnesses, including during visits to the Syrian Arab Republic, and obtaining photographs, videos, documents and other materials; (e) obtaining analysis and expert assessments from several forensic institutes; (f) obtaining satellite imagery and analysis thereof; (g) obtaining expert analysis in respect of medical effects, munitions and their delivery methods, aircraft configurations and capabilities, plume dispersion, and chemistry of toxic agents; (h) obtaining information about weather conditions; and

- (i) attending expert briefings. Upon obtaining the above-mentioned information, **the Mechanism conducted extensive analysis of the information and material that it had obtained.**
12. With a view to identifying those responsible, the investigation was aimed at establishing, to the greatest extent feasible, the circumstances of the use of the chemical weapons, including in respect of the following: (a) the precise date and time of the incident; (b) **the impact location**; (c) **the munition** used; (d) **the munition delivery method**; and (e) the medical effects and response. In collecting and analysing the information relating the incidents, the Mechanism prepared a case file for each incident, documenting the information collected and the analysis performed in respect of each scenario.
13. Following an invitation by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Head of the Mechanism on 28 July 2017, and the Government's agreement that the Mechanism's liaison officer should take up his duties in Damascus, members of the Mechanism made several visits to the Syrian Arab Republic in support of the investigation. The Head of the Mechanism visited Damascus from 19 to 21 August, and the Mechanism's technical teams visited Damascus from 7 to 11 September and Sha'irat airbase from 8 to 10 October. **Throughout its mandate, the Mechanism worked actively to obtain information from Member States, international and non-governmental organizations,** individuals and other relevant entities.
14. The Mechanism did not visit the scenes of the incidents at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun. While the Leadership Panel considered that visits to those sites would have been of value, such value would diminish over time. Furthermore, the Panel was required to weigh the security risks of such visits against their possible benefits for the investigation.
15. **With respect to Khan Shaykhun, the crater from which the sarin emanated had been disturbed after the incident and subsequently filled with concrete.** Accordingly, the integrity of the scene had been compromised. The Leadership Panel considered that the high security risk of a site visit to Khan Shaykhun, which is currently in a situation of armed conflict and **under the control of a listed terrorist organization (Nusrah Front)**, outweighed the possible benefits for the investigation. The Leadership Panel decided to keep the issue under review. Should conditions improve, and should it be determined that an on-site investigation would produce valuable new information, a visit could take place in the future. In that context, the Mechanism recently received an updated security advisory noting changes in the extent of the control exerted by various groups and additional parties involved, including increased complexity involving indirect artillery fire and recurrent air strikes.
16. Similarly, in the case of Umm Hawsh, the passage of time between the occurrence of the event in mid-September 2016 and the commencement of the Mechanism's investigation on 25 May 2017, and the fact that the integrity of the scene of the incident had not been preserved, called into question the value of such a visit. Moreover, **in the light of the extensive information that the Mechanism had been able to obtain from witnesses, an on-site visit would have provided little additional value.** (What about the videos, photographs, satellite imagery?)
17. The Mechanism also noted that it would have been difficult to visit any of these sites without putting at risk persons who cooperated with it. Nevertheless, the Leadership Panel considered that **the Mechanism had gathered sufficient information to come to a conclusion in both cases.**
18. The Mechanism conducted interviews with more than 30 victims and witnesses who had been present at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun at the relevant

times, in addition to those interviewed by the Fact-Finding Mission. Regarding Umm Hawsh, these included victims of the attack, journalists who had been present in the immediate aftermath of the attack, doctors who had treated victims, and military commanders. **Regarding the incident at Khan Shaykhun, witnesses included residents, personnel from Sha'irat airbase, government officials, doctors who had treated victims, rescue personnel and commanders of non-State armed groups.**

19. **The Mechanism obtained information regarding the physical characteristics of the sites through satellite imagery taken both before and after the incidents, the analysis of which assisted the Mechanism in determining the timing and precise location of the events being investigated.** Moreover, the **Mechanism collected numerous photographs and videos relating to the incidents both directly from witnesses and from other sources**, including the Syrian Arab Republic. Those **images and videos depict impact locations; impact effects, such as plumes and building damage; casualties; and munition remnants.** The Mechanism obtained **forensic analysis of more than 250 videos and photographs**, including to determine their authenticity and the times and places at which they had been taken.
20. Given that a significant amount of the information collected by the Mechanism was available only in Arabic, including a large volume of medical records, interviews, logbooks and videos (more than 435 files), the Mechanism employed its own translators and established quality control measures in order to translate the materials into English so that they could be used by its investigators.
21. The Mechanism corroborated information considered important to its investigations and **made assessments only on the basis of credible and reliable information.** In that regard, identifying circular reporting was important in order to ensure that the corroboration was based on independent sources of information.
22. The **Mechanism engaged several internationally recognized forensic and specialist defence institutes as well as OPCW** -designated laboratories, considered to have established expertise and a record of outstanding performance, to provide forensic and expert support for the investigation. The forensic institutes and OPCW - designated laboratories are accredited in accordance with the International Organization for Standardization standard relating to a broad spectrum of laboratory work (ISO 17025). **They were engaged by the Mechanism to authenticate photographs and video footage;** to verify the times and places at which the photographs and footage had been taken; and to **provide independent expert assessments and simulations** with respect to items depicted, as well as chemical synthesis and analysis. **The Mechanism also consulted with several internationally recognized experts in energetic materials and the medical effects of chemical warfare agents.**
23. With regard to Umm Hawsh, expert analysis was provided in respect of the impact location; the munition used, its trajectory and its likely delivery method; and the medical effects on the victims. Regarding Khan Shaykhun, **expert analysis was provided with respect to the nature of the plumes resulting from explosions; the characteristics of the crater and their likely cause; the remnants of the munitions; the dispersion of sarin; the explosives used and their delivery methods;** and the medical effects and their treatment. In-depth expert analysis was also provided with respect to the chemistry of sarin.

Leadership Panel's assessment of the cases

24. The Leadership Panel reviewed the case files that had been prepared regarding the incidents, in which the **Mechanism had carefully pieced together all available information to determine the evidence obtained in respect of the essential elements**

of the cases. The results of the respective investigations were assessed according to the criteria of credibility and reliability.

25. The Leadership Panel determined that, in order to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons on the dates and at the times of the two incidents in which, according to the determination of the Fact-Finding Mission, such use had occurred, a finding must be made in accordance with the standards of evidence described in the first report of the Mechanism (see [S/2016/142](#)). The Panel also determined that it must be satisfied that the information used as the basis for **its findings was credible and reliable and that each significant element was corroborated by information from independent sources, including forensic institutes and independent scientific experts.**

IV. Assessment, findings and conclusion

A. Cases under investigation

26. *Umm Hawsh*. On 4 May 2017, the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the report entitled "Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding the incident of 16 September 2016, as reported in the note verbale of the Syrian Arab Republic, number 113, dated 29 November 2016" (see [S/2017/400](#)). In the section of that report entitled "Conclusions", the Fact-Finding Mission confirmed that the two female casualties reported to have been involved in the incident in Umm Hawsh of 16 September 2016 had been exposed to sulfur mustard.
27. *Khan Shaykhun*. Further to a status update by the Fact-Finding Mission regarding a reported incident in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 (see [S/2017/440](#)), on 30 June 2017 the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the document entitled "Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding an alleged incident in Khan Shaykhun, Syrian Arab Republic, April 2017" (see [S/2017/567](#)). On the basis of its work, **the Fact-Finding Mission had concluded that a large number of people, some of whom had died, had been exposed to sarin or a sarin-like substance, and that such a release could only be determined to have been the use of sarin as a chemical weapon.**

B. Leadership Panel's assessments and findings

28. The following summarizes the work of the Mechanism and the assessment and findings of the Leadership Panel.
29. Full descriptions of the Mechanism's investigations into the incidents at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun are contained in annexes I and II, respectively.

Umm Hawsh

30. In conducting its comprehensive investigation into the case, the Mechanism used as a starting point the information and materials collected and prepared by the Fact-Finding Mission. It interviewed 10 witnesses in addition to those questioned by the Fact-Finding Mission and again interviewed the two victims. It also collected and reviewed significant amounts of additional material, including videos, photographs, satellite imagery and medical records. Furthermore, the Mechanism obtained independent expert assessments and analysis regarding the munitions used and their trajectory, as well as the medical effects on the victims and the treatment administered to them.
31. The Mechanism determined that the incident affecting the two victims had occurred on 15 September 2016 at approximately 1500 to 1600 hours. The

Mechanism made this finding on the basis of the following: medical records indicating that the victims had been admitted to Afrin Hospital on 16 September 2016, approximately 23 hours after their exposure to the chemical agent; witness interviews; and the determination of medical experts that the blisters of the victims would have been at least 12 hours old at the time of their initial hospitalization.

32. On the basis of further witness statements, satellite imagery and verified footage from the above-mentioned news crew, the Mechanism found that a second incident involving the use of chemical weapons had occurred on the following day, 16 September 2016, when a mortar shell had been lodged into the pavement between 1315 and 1500 hours.
33. On the basis of witness interviews, the Mechanism determined that a number of people in addition to the two victims interviewed by the Fact-Finding Mission might have been affected by sulfur mustard and in need of medical attention. Their symptoms ranged from slight to severe, with the two victims still suffering from the consequences to date. The Mechanism identified and interviewed only the two victims.
34. Regarding the make and origin of the mortar shells, forensic analysis determined that the mortar shell recovered from the pavement was of an improvised or makeshift origin. On the basis of witness descriptions and a comparative analysis of photographs of the mortar shells, experts determined the munition recovered from the house to be of the same type as the one found in the pavement.
35. The forensic institutes and individual experts determined the range of the mortar shells to be from 1 to 2 km. The delivery trajectory of the mortar shell found in the pavement was determined to have originated from a point somewhere to the east or south-east of the village. It was difficult to arrive at a precise determination as to the trajectory of the mortar shell that had hit the house. However, on the basis of the assessed trajectory of the mortar shell that had damaged the wall of the house, combined with that of the munition found in the pavement, forensic analysis indicated that the most likely launch point had been somewhere to the east or south - east of the village.
36. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that there is sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:
 - (a) The trajectory of the mortar shell found in the pavement was determined to have originated from a point somewhere to the east or south -east of the village. The damage to the victim's house indicated that the mortar shell that had caused it had originated from a point south-east of the village;
 - (b) Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was fighting against the Syrian Democratic Forces from the outskirts of Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016;
 - (c) ISIL was positioned along three sides of Umm Hawsh, specifically to the east of the village (the assessed origin of the chemical mortar shells);
 - (d) Owing to the limited range (1 to 2 km) of the mortar shells, only ISIL and the Syrian Democratic Forces were within striking distance of the impact locations;
 - (e) As the Syrian Democratic Forces and ISIL were in active combat and witness statements and forensic analysis support the conclusion that the mortar shells came from the direction of ISIL-held areas, it is very unlikely that the Syrian Democratic Forces are responsible for the incident;

- (f) Unlike ISIL, which was found by the Mechanism to have used sulfur mustard in Marea in August 2015 (see S/2016/738/Rev.1), there is no evidence that the Syrian Democratic Forces have used sulfur mustard in the past.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that ISIL is responsible for the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in annex I.

Khan Shaykhun

37. Using the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission as a starting point, the Mechanism conducted a comprehensive investigation into the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The Mechanism interviewed 17 witnesses in addition to those interviewed by the Fact-Finding Mission and collected and reviewed material not obtained by the Fact-Finding Mission. The Mechanism obtained substantial information on activities of the Syrian Arab Air Force on 4 April 2017.
38. The Mechanism examined eight possible scenarios regarding how the incident had occurred. On the basis of the information obtained, the following two scenarios were further investigated: (a) sarin had been released through an aerial bomb; or (b) sarin had been released through the explosion of an improvised explosive device placed on the ground. A third scenario with two alternatives was also investigated, neither of which was found to be linked to the release of sarin. (These scenarios assumed a small explosive munition detonated on the ground. The UN munitions experts rejected these scenarios because of a lack of visible damage to an electrical substation that was roughly 5 meters from the center of the crater. Our detailed analysis shows that a small explosive munition of the type assumed by the investigators would *not* cause damage to the substation. The rejection of these scenarios was therefore based on a flawed understanding of munitions effects.)
39. The Mechanism determined that sarin had been released from the location of a crater in the northern part of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017.
40. On the basis of their review of photographs, videos and satellite images, the forensic institutes and individual experts (who were these individual experts?) engaged by the Mechanism determined that the crater had most likely been caused by a heavy object travelling at high velocity, such as an aerial bomb with a small explosive charge. Examining the munition remnants observed inside the crater, the institutes and experts (Again, who were these "other" experts?) concluded that the remnants were pieces of a thin-walled munition from 300 to 500 mm in diameter and were likely from an aerial bomb. (As is shown in detail in the attachment to this annotated document, there is *no* forensic evidence or analysis to support this conclusion. The bomb's should have left extensive debris in and around the crater, including end-plates and tail, and sheets of metal associated with the breakup of the thin walled bomb. Such bomb-debris was omnipresent at the nerve agent attack of August 21, 2019 in Ghouta. Why is there no such debris in this attack?)
41. The Mechanism also examined whether an improvised explosive device could have caused the crater. While that possibility could not be completely ruled out, the experts determined that that scenario was less likely, because an improvised explosive device would have caused more damage to the surroundings than had been observed at the scene. (Our detailed calculations of the explosive effects associated with the formation of the crater show that this conclusion is not correct. Our explosive effects calculations predict that damage to surroundings should *not* have occurred). Furthermore, no witnesses had reported the placement or explosion of an improvised explosive device from the ground.
42. The Mechanism received information about the operation of Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft in the area of Khan Shaykhun indicating that such aircraft may have been in a position to launch aerial bombs in the vicinity. At the same time, however, Syrian Arab Air Force flight records and other records provided by the Syrian Arab Republic make no mention of Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. Furthermore, a representative of the Syrian Arab Air Force stated to the Mechanism that no Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft had attacked Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.
43. The Mechanism received conflicting information about the deployment of aircraft in Khan Shaykhun that morning. On 6 and 13 April 2017, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had made public statements that the Syrian Arab Air Force had bombed Khan Shaykhun with conventional bombs at approximately 1130 to 1200 hours. Furthermore, the Mechanism obtained original video footage from two separate witnesses that showed four plumes caused by explosives across Khan

Shaykhun. The footage was confirmed by forensic analysis to be authentic and to have been filmed in Khan Shaykhun between 0642 and 0652 hours on 4 April 2017. (This statement refers to “forensic analysis” contradicts the forensic evidence. The video footage shows the bomb plumes were blowing in the opposite direction of the wind on April 4, 2017. See page 16 of the attachment for the photographic evidence that contradicts the above citation by the JIM. The actual video shows bomb debris clouds from explosions of bombs in the 500 to 1000 pound range. The before and after satellite photographs cited by the JIM as evidence of bombing, shown on pages 14, 15, and 16 of the attachment, show absolutely no evidence of bomb damage from 500 to 1000 pound bombs. Our analysis of the video of the bomb debris clouds cited by the JIM as evidence leads to the conclusion that the bombings shown in the video did not occur on April 4, 2017, but instead occurred from another raid at a different time.)

44. The Mechanism examined the nature of the rescue and health-care operations following the mass casualty situation caused by the release of sarin in Khan Shaykhun. At present, the Mechanism cannot verify the total number of persons who either died or were injured as a result of the attack, but concludes, on the basis of its interviews with victims and medical personnel, its review of medical records and its consultations with medical experts whom it has engaged, that the response to the incident largely correlated to the reported number of casualties and victims.
45. The Mechanism commissioned an in-depth laboratory study of the origin of the precursor chemical methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) used to produce the binary sarin released in Khan Shaykhun. The study revealed that the sarin had most likely been made with the precursor DF from the original stock from the Syrian Arab Republic. An initial screening of reports concerning previous incidents of the release of sarin in the Syrian Arab Republic showed that some “marker chemicals” appeared to be present in environmental samples. This would warrant further study. This finding relates only to the origin of the DF used as a precursor, not to those responsible for the dissemination of sarin.
46. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that the information that it has obtained constitutes sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:
 - (a) Aircraft dropped munitions over Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017; (No bombing damage. See the examples of before and after satellite photographs photographs cited by the JIM on pages 14, 15, and 16 in the attachment to this annotated document.)
 - (b) An aircraft of the Syrian Arab Republic was in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;
 - (c) The crater from which the sarin emanated was created on the morning of 4 April 2017;
 - (d) The crater was caused by the impact of an aerial bomb travelling at high velocity; (No forensic evidence to support this claim. The high velocity bomb would hit the ground at roughly 250 mph (400km/hour) leaving large pieces of metal debris around the impact crater. There is no evidence of such debris.)
 - (e) A large number of people were affected by sarin between 0630 and 0700 hours on the morning of 4 April 2017;
 - (f) The number of persons affected by the release of sarin on 4 April 2017, and the fact that sarin reportedly continued to be present at the site of the crater 10 days after the incident, indicate that a large amount of sarin was likely released, which is consistent with its being dispersed through a chemical aerial bomb; (Videos cited by the JIM show unprotected individuals sitting inside the crater collecting samples one day after the sarin release. See images on pages 1,2, and 3 of attachment. According to the JIM, so much sarin was released by the bomb at the crater that sarin was detected 10 days later 80 m to the east of the crater as a result of the large amount of initially deposited sarin. Yet unprotected individuals could dig inside the crater one day later with essentially no negative effects from sarin exposure.)
 - (g) The symptoms of victims and their medical treatment, as well as the scale of the incident, are consistent with a large -scale intoxication of sarin; (ditto)
 - (h) The sarin identified in the samples taken from Khan Shaykhun was found to have most likely been made with a precursor (DF) from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic;
 - (i) The irregularities described in annex II are not of such a nature as to call into question the aforementioned findings. (See contradictory photographic evidence cited by the JIM in the 16 page attachment at the end of this annotated document)

On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that the Syrian Arab

Republic is responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in annex II.

(CONCLUSION: There forensic evidence cited by the JIM to support the above conclusions unambiguously contradict the stated finding. That is, all of the critical forensic evidence cited and described in their own reports is contradicted by an independent review of the cited evidence. See the review of the photographic evidence cited above by the JIM in the attachment at the end of this annotated document.)

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V. Other activities

A. Interaction with Member States and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Syrian Arab Republic

47. In accordance with resolution [2235 \(2015\)](#), the Syrian Arab Republic, and all parties in that country, are to fully cooperate with the Mechanism, including by providing full access to all locations, individuals and materials in the Syrian Arab Republic that the Mechanism deems relevant to its investigation. The Syrian Arab Republic engaged constructively with the Mechanism and demonstrated its commitment to cooperating with the Mechanism and facilitating its requests for access to information and witnesses. The Mechanism maintained regular contact with the relevant authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic.
48. The Mechanism engaged with the Syrian Arab Republic for planning purposes, including by requesting that a liaison officer be based in Damascus. The Mechanism received a positive response to that request on 11 July 2017 and thereafter commenced planning to visit the country.
49. In letters dated 5 and 19 July 2017, the Head of the Mechanism requested that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic provide official records regarding arrangements and movements at Sha'irat airbase with respect to 4 April 2017.
50. During the first visit to Damascus by members of the Leadership Panel, from 19 to 21 August 2017, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic provided all materials requested by the Mechanism. During that mission, the Head of the Mechanism met with representatives of the Government, including the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates and members of the armed forces.
51. During the Mechanism's second visit to Damascus, from 7 to 11 September 2017, a technical team of the Mechanism conducted witness interviews, collected information and met with representatives of the Government, including officials from the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre.
52. During its third visit, from 8 to 10 October 2017, the Mechanism went to Sha'irat airbase. After having received information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic during its first and second visits to Damascus, the Mechanism considered that such a visit would be of value to its investigation into the incident at Khan Shaykhun. The technical visit had the following objectives: (a) to verify the authenticity of the logbooks and flight operations records from 4 April 2017; (b) to review entry and exit logs and interview responsible personnel; (c) to photograph the types of munitions flown on 4 April 2017 in accordance with the logs received; and (d) to photograph the mechanisms for attaching such munitions onto Sukhoi Su-22 aircraft. Collecting samples at the airbase was not an objective of the visit; the Mechanism had determined that doing so would not advance the investigation. The Mechanism considered that if a single chemical munition had been flown from the airbase, there was little chance of finding any trace of sarin or its degradation products at an airbase of that size without specific information as to where to collect samples.
53. In addition to carrying out those visits to the Syrian Arab Republic, the Leadership Panel held regular meetings with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic in New York.
54. As stated in the fourth, fifth and sixth reports of the Mechanism (see [S/2016/888](#), [S/2017/131](#) and [S/2017/552](#)), on 10 October 2016 the Syrian Arab Republic notified the Mechanism that the Syrian national committee had opened an

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internal investigation, which included flight plans and air operations. To date, the Syrian Arab Republic has not provided the Mechanism with the outcomes of the investigation.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

55. The Mechanism's investigation initially commenced with a comprehensive review and analysis of all the information collected and prepared by the Fact-Finding Mission regarding the two cases. This comprised 2,554 files, which included documents, video interviews, audio recordings, photographs and laboratory results.
56. OPCW provided the Mechanism with three technical experts who were deployed with the Mechanism's technical team to visit Sha'irat airbase. The experts provided the Mechanism with additional specialized skills, including to ensure the safety of the operation.
57. OPCW also provided invaluable support through its laboratory and its designated laboratory network.
58. The Leadership Panel was in regular contact with the Director-General of OPCW both from New York and in The Hague. Moreover, the Mechanism interacted with OPCW on a frequent basis throughout the Mechanism's mandate.

Information from Member States

59. The Leadership Panel sent formal requests for information to Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, members of the Security Council and countries in the region, on three occasions. The requests for information were sent on 15 June 2017, regarding the case at Umm Hawsh; on 5 July 2017, regarding the case at Khan Shaykhun; and on 30 August 2017, regarding both cases. The Mechanism also sent tailored follow-up requests regarding both cases to a number of Member States that had responded to the initial requests.
60. Twelve Member States provided case-specific information, which was subjected to the same rigorous review and analysis as other information gathered. The Mechanism always sought to collect additional material from at least one other independent source for corroboration purposes.
61. Throughout the reporting period, the Leadership Panel met with Member States, including members of the Security Council. This was also an opportunity to brief Member States on the general status of the work of the Mechanism and to engage with regional States. In addition, members of the Leadership Panel visited the capitals of four Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, at their invitation, to be briefed on specific aspects of the two cases.

Allegations from Member States

62. Since the issuance of its sixth report on 28 June 2017, the Mechanism has formally received 15 allegations related to non-State actors' acquisition, possession or transfer of, or intent to use, chemical weapons or toxic chemicals. Two allegations specifically referred to ISIL. Thirteen allegations also included the acquisition of missiles and rockets fitted with toxic chemicals by non-State actors, including seven allegations involving the Nusrah Front. Those allegations were shared with OPCW.

B. Consultation with United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies

63. In fulfilling its mandate, the Mechanism consulted appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies to exchange information, as encouraged in resolution 2319 (2016), including with the experts of those bodies.

C. Information management

64. The Mechanism took measures to ensure that its personnel complied with the confidentiality and security protection requirements set out in the memorandum of understanding concluded between the Mechanism and OPCW on 26 November 2015, concerning the provision of access to and the storage and handling of information.

65. All personnel and all other individuals and entities with whom the Mechanism engaged were also required to enter into confidentiality undertakings.

66. The Mechanism followed standard operating procedures and guidelines on information management (see S/2016/888, annex), as well as on the conduct of interviews and the collection of evidence and information, including chain-of-custody forms. In addition, the Mechanism applied the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6) in relation to the information collected and produced by the Mechanism. Furthermore, relevant sections of the Secretary-General's bulletin on record-keeping and the management of United Nations archives (ST/SGB/2007/5), concerning the creation, management and disposition of records, were applied by the Mechanism.

VI. Challenges, risks and constraints

67. While the Mechanism actively collected information relevant to its investigations from a range of sources, it also depended on Member States to assist by providing quality information in a timely manner.

68. The conditions for receiving information in a highly sensitive political environment with complex security considerations made the investigation extremely challenging. On-site visits were subject to high security risks. Moreover, as an investigative body without judicial powers, the Mechanism relied on the voluntary cooperation of witnesses, was required to meet strict standards of confidentiality in all its operations, and was to ensure the safety of witnesses without any means of witness protection.

VII. Way forward

69. The Leadership Panel understands that several additional cases are currently subject to fact-finding missions. On the basis of its recent work, the Leadership Panel commends the continued scientific progress and development that have provided invaluable support for complex investigations of this nature. In that regard, it is important to maintain and enhance a network of internationally recognized experts on these issues.

70. The Leadership Panel notes that the investigations conducted during the reporting period provided a series of important lessons for future investigations of this nature, which should be captured by conducting a comprehensive lessons-learned exercise.

71. It is vital that the international community maintain an effective investigative capacity to rapidly respond to any future use of chemical weapons, including acts of chemical terrorism.

(Agreed, towards this end an independent and comprehensive review of the actual video evidence cited by the JIM will need to be conducted. It will also be necessary for there to be a complete review of the numerous findings cited by the JIM about the effects of munitions. The findings on munitions effects cited by the JIM are inconsistent with basic technical facts about the effects of munitions.)

VIII. Concluding remarks

72. The Leadership Panel is deeply concerned by the finding of the Fact-Finding Mission that chemical weapons — sulfur mustard and sarin — were used. The Panel expresses its shock and dismay at the existence and use of these weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and its deep sympathy to those affected by them. The Panel encourages the international community not only to make united efforts to ensure that such use will not be repeated, but also to provide assistance to those affected.

73. The continuing use of chemical weapons, including by non-State actors, is deeply disturbing. If such use, notwithstanding its prohibition by the international community, is not stopped now, a lack of consequences will surely encourage others to follow, not only in the Syrian Arab Republic, but also elsewhere. This is the time to bring these acts to an end.

74. The Leadership Panel wishes to give recognition to the professionalism, dedication and sacrifice of its staff, and to express its deep appreciation for all their work and commitment during the reporting period.

(The Leadership Panel Report does not reflect the input of a truly professional staff. Many of the glaring technical errors on munitions and their effects in the JIM annex starting on page 21 of this annotated document would have been caught if there was even a cursory review of the final report by an expert. The errors are so glaring that it is implausible they could have been made by true experts.)

75. The Leadership Panel extends its appreciation for the support received from the United Nations Secretariat, in particular the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and from OPCW, which provided invaluable technical and logistical support to the Mechanism.

(It does not appear that this report was reviewed by OPCW technical experts before it was released to the UN Security Council. See the numerous corrections to very significant technical errors in the annotated annex starting on annotated page 21.)

I. Findings of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic

1. On the basis of interviews conducted with witnesses, including a visit to the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre in Barzah to conduct physical examinations of items related to the reported incidents, the documents reviewed and the results of blood sample analyses, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic confirmed that the two female casualties reported to have been involved in the incidents in Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016 had been exposed to sulfur mustard. Furthermore, the Fact-Finding Mission stated that it had conducted a thorough technical weapon exploitation on a 217-mm-calibre mortar. Supported by the results of laboratory analyses, the Fact-Finding Mission determined that that mortar shell contained sulfur mustard.

II. Investigation by the Mechanism

2. The Mechanism formulated possible scenarios to ensure that it approached the investigation comprehensively and in an objective and impartial manner. While the Mechanism sought to collect and analyse as much information as possible in connection with each scenario, by the end of the investigation most of the information obtained supported one scenario: that sulfur mustard munitions, one of which had caused the exposure of the victims, had been fired on Umm Hawsh by an actor.

Background

3. Umm Hawsh (also known as Um Hosh) is a village in Aleppo Governorate (Marea subdistrict, I'zaz District). It is located at coordinates 36°24'51.12"N, 37°12'38.16"E, in the midst of a triangle of three larger cities: Aleppo, I'zaz and Bab. Umm Hawsh is approximately 23 km north-east of Aleppo city and 35 km south of the Bab al-Salam border crossing with Turkey. It is located in a fork between two motorways to the north of Aleppo, that is, east of the M214 and west of the M20 motorways.

4. In 2004, the population of Umm Hawsh, according to Syrian census data from that year, was 3,542. At the time of the incidents in September 2016, the population of Umm Hawsh was estimated to be 728.

5. Umm Hawsh and the surrounding area fell under the control of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on 9 August 2015. It was taken over by the Syrian Democratic Forces on 30 August 2016. Additional non-State armed groups were present approximately 8 km to the north of Umm Hawsh, in Marea. The forces of the Syrian Arab Republic and its allies were not present in Umm Hawsh at the time of the incidents; the closest that they appear to have been was 8.7 km away in Misqan. By the time of the sulfur mustard incident, the front-line and conflict dynamics had not changed since Umm Hawsh had been captured by the Syrian Democratic Forces on 30 August 2016. At that time, ISIL remained from 600 to 800 m east and 1 km north of the village, with an additional presence to the south of the village.

Date and time

6. The incident leading to the exposure of the victims to sulfur mustard has been determined to have occurred at a house in Umm Hawsh at approximately 1500 to 1600 hours on Thursday, 15 September 2016. The Mechanism based that finding on the following: medical records indicating that the victims had been admitted to Afrin Hospital on 16 September 2016, approximately 23 hours after their exposure to the chemical agent; witness interviews; and the assessment of medical experts that the blisters of the victims would have been at least 12 hours old at the time of their initial hospitalization.

7. The Mechanism found that the following day, Friday, 16 September, a mortar shell had been lodged in a pavement in the village at approximately 1315 to 1500 hours. That assessment is based on verified media footage, witness statements and analysis of satellite imagery.

Impact location

8. The Mechanism determined the location of the house¹ struck by a mortar shell through a variety of means. One of the victims, who lived in the house, identified the location on the basis of photographs presented during an interview with the Mechanism. The photographs included images of the house, the street and the village. Moreover, the information regarding the location of the house was corroborated through forensic analysis, the statements of several other witnesses, a review of satellite imagery and the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission. The identification of the location was also supported by original videos provided to the Mechanism showing damage to the house.

9. The mortar shell in the pavement was determined to be located at approximately 36°24'43.29"N, 37°12'31.16"E. The identification of the location was based on forensic analysis of video footage taken by news crews who filmed the munition still protruding from the pavement. The finding regarding the location of the mortar shell in the pavement was corroborated through analysis of satellite imagery, the statements of three witnesses and the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence team of the Russian Federation.

Munition analysis

10. Several witnesses interviewed by the Mechanism confirmed that a mortar shell or a munition had hit the house of one of the two victims. The mortar shell had not been recovered, as the owner of the house had thrown it away sometime after the incident. However, a news crew had photographed a damaged mortar shell the following day and provided images to the Mechanism. The owner of the house identified the mortar shell from photographs taken by the news crew. A forensic institute and an expert engaged by the Mechanism who specializes in energetic materials stated that the mortar shell that had hit the house was very likely the same type as the mortar shell found in the pavement. A defence research institute, a forensic institute and an expert consultant, all engaged by the Mechanism, observed that the mortar shell recovered from the pavement was of poor production quality. After the munition had hit the house, five witnesses described qualities, such as smell, indicating that the mortar shell contained sulfur mustard.

¹ While the Mechanism obtained the geographical coordinates of the house damaged by the mortar, its location is not included in the present report as a result of concern for the safety and security of the victims.

11. With respect to the origin of the mortar shells, experts in energetic materials noted that the mortar shell recovered from the pavement had an appearance similar to those made through makeshift large-scale production methods. The Fact-Finding Mission established that the munition found in the pavement was a 217-mm-calibre mortar shell. Mortars fitting 217-mm-calibre mortar shells are easily produced from available high-quality steel tubing. The range of such munitions is from 1 to 2 km. On the basis of the limited information available, a defence research institute commissioned by the Mechanism concluded that it was impossible to identify the manufacturer(s) of the munitions.

12. Regarding the characteristics of the munition that had caused damage to the house, an expert in energetic materials noted that, on the basis of a review of photographs and video footage, the damage was consistent with having been caused by a mortar shell fired from a mortar with a calibre of approximately 220 mm. According to the Fact-Finding Mission, the mortar shell in the pavement contained sulfur mustard. The pavement was not seriously damaged, and there was likely residual contamination from the leaking munition. A forensic institute observed that the lack of a major explosion suggested that these mortar shells were designed to carry a chemical agent. Regarding the penetration of the pavement by the mortar shell, two experts in energetic materials observed that it had occurred with little sign of damage to either the mortar shell or the pavement itself. Both experts tried to find an explanation, with one noting that there was little resistance in the pavement because of an observed pre-existing cavity, which the mortar shell had penetrated.

13. With respect to the range of the mortar shells, forensic institutes and experts commissioned by the Mechanism determined the distance from where they had been launched to the impact site to be from 1 to 2 km. They also noted that the range and accuracy of homemade mortar shells are imprecise and depend on a number of variables, including the amount of explosive powder used.

14. In addition, the same experts determined the trajectory of the mortar shell found in the pavement to have originated from a point to the east or south-east of the village. Witnesses confirmed that it had originated from the eastern side of Umm Hawsh. The assessed trajectory of the mortar shell that had struck the house was less precise, as it was based on the damage caused to the wall of the house. That trajectory was determined to be an arc from due east to nearly due west, with its subjective central line originating from the south-east.

Medical effects and response

15. When interviewed by the Mechanism, the victim stated that, upon finding the house had been damaged by the mortar shell, she had commenced cleaning the house with her bare hands using laundry detergent. She later asked a neighbour to help. Both cleaned for approximately four hours, until after the Maghrib call to prayer. The owner of the house reported becoming sick at about that time, including experiencing visual impairment. She took a shower, and later felt dizzy and vomited. The following morning, members of the Syrian Democratic Forces took the victim to Tall Rif'at Hospice; however, no doctors were available at the time. Later that day, they went to Afrin Hospital, where the victim lost consciousness. A week later, the victim awakened with bandaged hands. She was subsequently admitted to a hospital in Damascus. The neighbour who helped to clean the house also became sick and

went to the hospital.

16. The Mechanism also interviewed the victim's neighbour, who stated that she had tried to clean the "oil" away using water and laundry detergent. At the start of the cleaning process, the victim could smell the chemical, but then grew somewhat accustomed to it. She went home to take a shower and later became dizzy and could

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not eat or drink. After going to a relative's house, the victim fell to the ground and began to vomit, before losing consciousness. By the next morning, she could no longer see and was transported to a hospital by relatives. They first went to Ahras Medical Centre, where the victim was treated. By that time, her whole body had become swollen and had developed blisters. By 1000 to 1100 hours, the victim had been taken to Afrin Hospital, where she stayed for 20 days. Still in poor condition, the victim then went to Kafr Naya Hospice and later to a hospital in Damascus. The victim could not speak, and her chest felt tight for a month.

17. Several sources indicate that other civilians and three fighters from non-State armed groups were also affected by the chemical incident. This information is only partially corroborated by one witness, who stated that Afrin Hospital had received one male adult and two children with mild symptoms as ambulant patients on 16 September 2016. Another witness suggested that a number of children had also been affected and taken to the hospital. This could not be corroborated by the Mechanism. Another witness insisted that the hospital had not received additional patients with similar symptoms, but only those two cases.

18. An additional witness indicated to the Mechanism that a relative had cleaned the furniture contaminated with sulfur mustard and, as a result, had developed minor symptoms on the fingers.

19. While a number of other people may have been affected by the sulfur mustard incident and needed medical attention, only two of them were identified and interviewed by the Mechanism. The victims' symptoms included large blisters on their upper and lower limbs and faces; they continue to suffer from the consequences of sulfur mustard exposure to date. Clinical toxicologists engaged by the Mechanism confirmed the exposure of the victims to sulfur mustard and noted that it might have permanent implications for their health.

Chemistry

20. The chemical agent that affected the victims is sulfur mustard. It is a blistering agent whose precursor chemicals are relatively cheap and easy to acquire.

21. The Fact-Finding Mission conducted chemical analysis of the samples of sulfur mustard. It concluded that the presence and relevant quantities of disulfide and trisulfide mustard analogues indicated that this mustard was most likely produced using the LeVinson chemical reaction process, which is widely understood to be an alternative and relatively uncomplicated method of producing sulfur mustard to which non-State actors might turn.

22. Witnesses and open sources point to ISIL as a possible perpetrator of the chemical attack. Information provided to the Mechanism indicates that ISIL had developed the capability to produce sulfur mustard as of 2015. ISIL had ample access to industrial zones, including oil and gas fields, in which to produce the relevant delivery systems, munitions and chemicals. ISIL has a historical record of using sulfur mustard, including in August 2015 in Marea (just 7.4 km north of Umm Hawsh). In its third report (S/2016/738/Rev.1), the Mechanism found that ISIL had the

capacity to produce sulfur mustard through the Levinstein process.

III. Assessment and findings by the Leadership Panel

23. In order to determine, to the greatest extent feasible, those who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of sulfur mustard on 15 and 16 September 2016 in Umm Hawsh, the Leadership Panel requested that the investigators examine four possible scenarios regarding how the events had

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unfolded. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the prevailing scenario that emerged was that sulfur mustard munitions, one of which had caused the exposure of victims, had been fired on Umm Hawsh by an actor.

24. Most of the information collected and analysed by the Mechanism supports this scenario. The majority of the evidence suggests that the munitions were fired from a location to the east or south-east, where one particular actor (ISIL) was positioned at the time of the incident.

25. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that the information that it has obtained constitutes sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:

(a) The trajectory of the mortar shell found in the pavement was determined to have originated from a point to the east or south-east of the impact location. The damage caused to the victim's house indicated that the trajectory of the mortar shell that had caused it had originated from a point to the south-east;

(b) ISIL was fighting against the Syrian Democratic Forces from the outskirts of Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016;

(c) ISIL was positioned along three sides of Umm Hawsh, specifically to the east and south-east of the village (the assessed origin of the chemical mortar shells);

(d) Owing to the limited range (1 to 2 km) of the mortar shells, only ISIL and the Syrian Democratic Forces were within striking distance of the impact locations;

(e) As the Syrian Democratic Forces and ISIL were in active combat and witness statements and forensic analysis support the conclusion that the mortar shell came from the direction of ISIL-held areas, it is very unlikely that the Syrian Democratic Forces were responsible for the incident;

(f) Unlike ISIL, which was found by the Mechanism to have used sulfur mustard in Marea in August 2015 (see [S/2016/738/Rev.1](#)), there is no evidence that the Syrian Democratic Forces have used sulfur mustard in the past.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that ISIL is responsible for the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in the present annex.

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Annex II

Khan Shaykhun

I. Findings of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic

1. On the basis of its analysis of biomedical specimens, interviews and supplementary material submitted during the interview process, as well as analysis of environmental samples, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic found that a large number of people, some of whom had died, had been exposed to sarin or a sarin-like substance at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. While it had received limited information on the dispersal mechanism and therefore had been unable to draw firm conclusions on that specific matter, it considered that **the release that had caused the exposure was likely to have been initiated in the crater** in the road, located close to the silos in the northern part of the town. It concluded that, **on the basis of such a release, the only determination that could be made was that sarin had been used as a weapon.**

(This conclusion contradicts the evidence in the videos cited by the JIM. It also contradicts many basic and well-known effects associated with exploding munitions – see below for further discussion of errors in this Annex and the images on pages 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in the attachment at the end of this annotated document.)

II. Investigation by the Mechanism

2. Upon receiving the final report of the Fact-Finding Mission on the incident of 4 April 2017 at Khan Shaykhun, the Mechanism conducted an in-depth investigation into the incident. The Leadership Panel defined the scope of the investigation by adopting an investigation plan that outlined eight possible scenarios, including those put forward by Member States, regarding how sarin had been released in Khan Shaykhun. While the Mechanism sought to collect and analyse as much information as possible in connection with each scenario, by the end of the investigation most of **the information obtained supported three scenarios:** (a) **sarin had been delivered through an aerial bomb** (No forensic evidence in support of this assertion) that had been dropped by an aircraft; (b) **sarin had been released from the ground as part of a staged attack;** (videos cited as evidence by the JIM show unambiguous evidence of tampering with the debris in the crater and dead animals planted at the crater site – see images on pages 1,2, 7 and 9 in the attachment the end of this annotated section.) or (c) **there had been an air strike by the Syrian Arab Air Force against a storage facility containing toxic chemicals, which had resulted in the dispersion of a toxic cloud.** (This is what the Russians say happened.)
3. The **first scenario is based on reports that aircraft were either seen or heard dropping bombs** (no forensic evidence of explosive bombs being dropped on Khan Sheikhoun on April 4, 2017 – inspection of before and after satellite photographs of the alleged bombing locations cited by the Leadership Panel shows no evidence of bomb damage – see before and after satellite photos of allegedly bombed areas on pages 14, 15, and 16 in the attachment at the end of this document.), over Khan Shaykhun early in the morning on 4 April 2017. Sarin is believed to have emanated from a point of impact on a road (hereinafter referred to as “the crater”) caused by an aerial bomb, located close to silos in the northern part of Khan Shaykhun.
4. **The second scenario is based on a report that sarin was released from the same crater as that in the first scenario, caused by an explosive charge placed on the ground containing sarin, so as to stage an attack for which the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic would be blamed.**
(A scenario was considered in which evidence might have been planted to stage an attack that would be blamed on the Syrian Arab Republic. Yet the JIM analysis ignores cited videos that show clear and unambiguous evidence of tampering at the scene! – see images on pages 1, 2, 7, and 9 indicating tampering at the scene at the end of this section.)
5. The third scenario involves a reported strike by the Syrian Arab Air Force on an ammunition depot on the eastern outskirts of Khan Shaykhun where workshops had been producing chemical warfare munitions. In a public statement, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that the Syrian Arab Air Force had only conducted an attack in Khan Shaykhun at around noon on 4 April 2017. An alternative third scenario is that a house in Khan Shaykhun that had been taken over by a non-State armed group and used for the storage of toxic chemicals was bombed on 4 April 2017, thus releasing toxic chemicals. (This is the scenario claimed by the Russians)

Background

6. Khan Shaykhun is both a town and a subdistrict of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man District, within the governorate of Idlib in north-western Syrian Arab Republic, with the coordinates 35.44°N, 36.65°E, at 376 m above sea level. Located about 10 km from the border of Hama Governorate to the south and about 100 km from Aleppo Governorate to the north, Khan Shaykhun is positioned on the M5 motorway, which runs from the Jordanian border in the southern part of the country, through Damascus city and to Aleppo city in the northern part of the country.
7. Recent information available to the Mechanism estimates that the subdistrict of Khan Shaykhun has a population of approximately 34,000, with the town itself having a population of 16,000.
8. **A review of open-source information indicates that, in mid-2014, the Nusra Front launched an offensive in southern Idlib Governorate and seized the town of Khan Shaykhun.** According to witness statements as well as open sources, on the date of the incident on 4 April 2017, the Levant Liberation Organization, which includes the Nusra Front as its major component, had a prominent presence in the area of Khan Shaykhun, with Ahrar al-Sham also being present in the general area, along with several other non-State armed groups.
9. A review of open sources also indicates that, on 21 March 2017, the Levant Liberation Organization and its allied groups launched an offensive against forces of the Syrian Arab Republic in the direction of Hama city from its positions in northern Hama Governorate. By 23 March 2017, the Levant Liberation Organization and its allied groups reportedly advanced to areas 3 to 5 km from the Hama city line and threatened to capture the Hama military airport. On 24 March 2017, Ahrar al-Sham and its allied groups reportedly launched a separate offensive in north-western Hama Governorate. Open-source information suggests that at around the same time, Syrian government forces started to gain momentum, although with some temporary setbacks, in repelling these attacks. Reinforcements reportedly arrived from other parts of the Syrian Arab Republic. Syrian government forces were also reportedly aided in repelling air attacks on locations in northern Hama and southern Idlib governorates. According to the Director-General of OPCW, sarin was found to have been released in Lataminah on 30 March 2017. By 3 April 2017, Syrian government forces had made rapid advances, reportedly regaining control over most of the areas lost after 21 March 2017, and had moved deeper into some of the areas that had been controlled by non-State armed groups prior to 21 March. **Media sources indicate that, between 17 March and 3 April 2017, aerial attacks were carried out on a regular basis against targets in Khan Shaykhun.**

Date and time

10. **On the basis of witness statements and forensic analysis of photographs and video footage, the Mechanism found that the sarin incident had occurred in Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours** local time on 4 April 2017. Moreover, the Mechanism collected multiple reports released by the media during the morning of 4 April 2017, which indicated that a “chemical attack” had occurred in Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours. **(As noted in the introduction to this report, 250 videos were supposed to have been reviewed in the process of the investigation. Yet copious descriptions of the video evidence in this report are directly contradicted by a review of the cited videos. See 16 page attachment with cited video data at the end of this annotated document.)**
11. **Witnesses reported that the alleged attack in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 had been carried out by an aircraft between 0630 and 0700 hours.** The Mechanism obtained **original photographs and video footage from witnesses showing plumes** on the morning of 4 April 2017, indicating that **several explosions had occurred in Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours. On the basis of forensic analysis, it was determined that the plume videos and images had been recorded on 4 April** **(No forensic evidence in support of these conclusions – satellite before and after photographs show absolutely no forensic evidence of bomb damage associated with the alleged April 4 attack. See images produced from video data on pages 14, 15, and 16 in the attachment at the end of this annotated document.)**

2017 between 0642 and 0652 hours. Further forensic analysis confirmed that the footage had not been manipulated and had been taken on the outskirts of Khan Shaykhun.

(Is a dead goat with drag marks behind it manipulated video footage? See Page 1 in attachment at the end of this annotated document. What about dead birds in cages that were supposedly collected at the scene? Page 2 of attachment. What about people with absolutely no protection digging in the crater where the Leadership Panel claims evidence of sarin was found 10 days after the attack?)

12. Moreover, on the basis of satellite images from 3 April 2017, which do not show the presence of the crater at that time, the Mechanism has confidence that the crater was caused by an impact on 4 April 2017.

(This satellite photo data from April 3, 2017 needs to be made available for review. The satellite data from April 6 does not show a single crater. It instead shows three craters and a damaged section of roof on an adjacent grain storage warehouse. See pages 8, 9, and 10 in the attachment. If there is satellite data for April 3, why are the before and after satellite photographs of the three other alleged bombing sites identified by the JIM taken on February 21 and April 6? There are no bomb craters in any of these three before and after satellite photographs. See images of the satellite photographs on pages 14, 15, and 16 at the end of this annotated document. The satellite data from April 3 needs to be made available for inspection by members of the UN Security Council.)

Early warning

13. Witnesses interviewed by the Mechanism described an “early warning system” (commonly referred to as “spotters”, “observers” or “observatories”) that possibly played a role in warning residents of the attack on 4 April 2017. By intercepting communications between aircraft of the Syrian Arab Air Force and the bases from which they are operated, members of the spotter network monitor flight activities and communicate early warning information to residents about impending air strikes.

14. The Mechanism collected information from witnesses to the effect that a first warning of a possible upcoming chemical attack had been received by the “Syria Civil Defence” (also known as the “White Helmets”) and spotters in Khan Shaykhun. Witnesses stated that the Syria Civil Defence in Khan Shaykhun had been in contact by way of the Internet with spotters and that, at approximately 0630 hours on 4 April 2017, the spotters had announced that a Sukhoi Su-22 military aircraft had taken off from Sha’irat airbase. A witness interviewed by the Mechanism, who reported having worked that morning as a spotter in Khan Shaykhun, recalled having received an alert concerning the take-off of a Su-22 from Sha’irat airbase on the morning of 4 April 2017. The witness stated that the alert had advised residents to be careful, as the aircraft was likely carrying toxic chemicals.

(A standard chemical munition weighing 250 to 300 kg would look almost the same as an explosive bomb of roughly the same weight. How could the spotter have possibly determined that the aircraft was likely carrying toxic chemicals?)

15. The Mechanism noted several witness statements suggesting that, on the morning of 4 April 2017, the early warning system might not have been fully functional. The Syria Civil Defence reported that, when the members of the first volunteer team had responded to the air strike, they had had no idea that it was a chemical attack and that they had all been poisoned. (This is compatible with JIM scenario 3, an attack on a building where chemicals were released, as described by the Russians. If the severity of the chemical release was as large as the Panel concludes, all of the people at the crater who were taking samples the next day without protection should have also been poisoned. See images of unprotected individuals sitting and digging in the crater on the morning of April 5, 2017 – a day after the attack.) Several witnesses stated that there had been no warning of an attack on the morning of 4 April, while others reported having received alerts at various times between 0630 and 0715 hours that morning.

16. While there are varying accounts as to whether the early warning system was fully functional that morning, the above information gathered by the Mechanism neither supports nor excludes any of the three scenarios.

Air deployment

17. While there are varying accounts of the nature and timing of the attack, and the subsequent number of explosions, several witnesses interviewed by the Mechanism and the Fact-Finding Mission stated that they had seen or heard aircraft flying over Khan Shaykhun in the early morning of 4 April 2017, in keeping with the scenario in which aircraft dropped bombs on Khan Shaykhun that morning.

18. The Mechanism collected two original videos, filmed by two witnesses from different angles, showing several plumes; the videos were confirmed by forensic institutes to have been filmed between 0642 and 0652 hours during the morning of 4 April 2017. Forensic analysis of the videos found that, at a certain point in each video, the sound of an aircraft could be heard in the background along with an explosion.

(For this conclusion to be correct, the three pairs of before and after satellite photos of the three bombed locations cited by the JIM should show clear evidence of bomb damage from bombs weighing between 500 and 1,000 pounds. Inspection of the images on pages 14, 15, and 16 in the attachment shows no evidence of such bomb damage.)

19. The Mechanism investigated whether a Syrian Arab Air Force Su -22 had taken off from Sha'irat airbase, located 110 km south of Khan Shaykhun, and launched an air attack on the town that morning. The Governments of France and the United States of America publicly provided information indicating that a **Syrian Arab Air Force Su-22 had taken off from Sha'irat airbase on 4 April 2017, flown over Khan Shaykhun at 0637 and 0646 hours, and launched up to six attacks around Khan Shaykhun.**

(Again, there is no forensic evidence for sites where before and after satellite photos were obtained)

20. The Mechanism requested that the Syrian Arab Republic provide official records with respect to activities carried out at Sha'irat airbase on 4 April 2017, including logbooks of all operations, movements at the airbase, flights, names of the pilots flying aircraft and a detailed map or plan showing the layout of the airbase. In response to that request, the Government provided the Mechanism with a set of copies of official documents relating to Sha'irat airbase, including extracts from handwritten Syrian Arab Air Force logbooks as well as a document detailing the airbase chain of command and an aerial image of the airbase.

21. During its visit to Sha'irat airbase, the Mechanism observed that the documents provided by the Syrian Arab Republic appeared to be copies of the originals. The technical visit had the following objectives: (a) to verify the authenticity of the logbooks and flight operation records from 4 April 2017; (b) to review entry and exit logs and interview responsible personnel; (c) to photograph the types of munitions flown on 4 April in accordance with logs received; and (d) to photograph the mechanisms by which such munitions were attached to Su-22 aircraft.

22. The Mechanism found no entries in any of the documents that referred specifically to Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. Two entries in a logbook provided details regarding the time of execution of missions that corresponded to the time frame of the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun. The operations relating to those flights had been logged as aerial attacks using conventional munitions targeting non-State armed groups in the vicinity of Kafr Zayta and Tall Hawash, situated approximately 8 km south-west and 18 km west of Khan Shaykhun, respectively.

23. The Mechanism interviewed the pilot associated with one of the entries in the logbook, who used the call sign "Quds 1" and had flown a Su -22 at the relevant time that day. The pilot stated that no chemical weapons had been used and that the mission that morning had been to carry out an attack to the west of Kafr Zayta using three 500 kg conventional munitions. This was found to be consistent with the details recorded in the logbook. According to the pilot, the closest distance to Khan Shaykhun flown on that date had been approximately 7 to 9 km, to carry out an attack against targets west of Kafr Zayta. While the Mechanism was able to confirm severe structural damage to a building in the general vicinity of one of those targets through analysis of satellite imagery, it could not precisely determine when the damage had occurred.

24. The Mechanism did not interview the pilot associated with the second entry. The Syrian Arab Republic informed the Mechanism that the pilot had later been shot down and was missing in action.

25. Taking samples was not an objective of the visit to Sha'irat airbase. The Mechanism had determined that the collection of samples at the airbase would not advance the investigation. **The Mechanism considered that if a single chemical munition had been flown from that base,** there was little chance of finding any trace of sarin or its degradation products at an airbase of that size (approximately 10 km²) without specific information as to where to collect samples.

(This is a peculiar allegation –the United States claimed that it had intelligence evidence of extensive planning and activity associated with loading chemicals on the plane.)

26. During a briefing given by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Mechanism in Damascus, a representative of the Syrian Arab Air Force stated that no aircraft of the Air Force had attacked Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. This contradicted the public statement made by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic (see para. 5 above). The Mechanism also interviewed the Commander of Sha'irat airbase, who stated that no aircraft from the airbase had attacked Khan Shaykhun on 4 April.
27. At the request of the Mechanism, the Syrian Arab Republic provided the exact coordinates of six locations targeted by the Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft operating from Sha'irat airbase on 4 April 2017. The coordinates were found to be similar to the description of the targets identified in the relevant logbook. While those entries include flight times that correspond to the likely timing of the sarin event at Khan Shaykhun, they refer to aerial attacks targeting unidentified non-State armed groups in the town of Tall Hawash and west of Kafr Zayta. As noted above, while the Mechanism could confirm that one of these locations had sustained damage, it could not confirm that the damage had occurred on 4 April.
28. **On 7 April 2017, United States authorities publicly released a statement and a map depicting a flight path of an aircraft originating from Sha'irat airbase that allegedly had been flying over Khan Shaykhun at approximately 0637 and 0646 hours.** (It is no surprise that the US would have detailed information about the flight path of the airplane. The flight path would have been filed prior to the mission in order to reduce the chances of fratricide from a mistaken identification of the aircraft. It is well known in the expert community that the Russians, Syrians, and United States file flight plans to keep each other informed about who was in the air and where. These arrangements also include information about what targets are going to be attacked. The US would have had this information from both the Syrian government and the Russians. Where is it? One public report stated that the US AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) observed explosions on the ground along with secondary explosions. This report could well be accurate, as the AWACS radar would easily see a radar reflection from the dust cloud from the first explosion and then later reflections from secondary explosions. Thus, even though the AWACS radar does not have imaging capability, it could certainly determine that there was an attack that resulted in multiple explosions at a single location in Khan Sheikhoun. Where is the data?) The Mechanism had access to another aerial map depicting the path of an aircraft alleged to have been in the airspace around Khan Shaykhun between approximately 0644 and 0651 hours on 4 April 2017. The aircraft was depicted as flying in a circular loop pattern in the vicinity of Kafr Zayta and north-east of Khan Shaykhun. The map indicated that the closest to Khan Shaykhun that the aircraft had flown had been approximately 5 km away. Additional information provided to the Mechanism referred to two aircraft that had taken off from Sha'irat airbase at around the same time as indicated above, 10 minutes apart, following the same flight path. On the basis of the above, the Mechanism found that air activity had taken place around Khan Shaykhun at about the time of the sarin incident.
29. The Mechanism compared the flight times of Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft taking off from Sha'irat airbase, as provided by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, with other flight information that it had received. The Syrian and other accounts are consistent in indicating that the Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft were in the air at the relevant time. Where the accounts diverge is with respect to whether or not the aircraft flew over or in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun.
30. As noted in paragraphs 19, 23 and 28 above, the Mechanism obtained information detailing the presence of a Su-22 within 5 km of Khan Shaykhun, as well as information provided by a Su-22 pilot interviewed by the Mechanism indicating that he had been within 7 to 9 km of Khan Shaykhun at the relevant time. The Mechanism consulted with a weapons expert to ascertain the confluence of distance and altitude from which it might be possible to hit Khan Shaykhun with an aerial bomb. The expert concluded that, depending on a number of variables such as altitude, speed and the flight path taken, it would be possible for such an aerial bomb to be dropped on the town from the aforementioned distances.
31. To date, the Mechanism has found no specific information confirming whether or not a Syrian Arab Air Force Su-22 operating from Sha'irat airbase launched an aerial attack against Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.

Ground explosion

32. The Mechanism also sought to collect information about possible activities related to the dissemination of sarin from an improvised explosive device on the ground in accordance with the second scenario. While the Mechanism found no information relating to the preparation of an explosion through such means, it noted

a witness statement that was consistent with that scenario. In an interview with the Mechanism, the witness reported waking up at approximately 0700 hours on 4 April 2017 to the sound of explosions. The witness stated that no aircraft had been flying over Khan Shaykhun at the time and that aircraft had begun to launch attacks only at around 1100 hours. (Possibly accurate testimony by a single witness – who knows?)

33. No witnesses reported any activities related to the placing of an explosive charge on the ground at the location of the incident.
34. The Syrian Arab Republic provided information to the Mechanism suggesting that the release of sarin had been associated with an above-ground explosion, using an explosive charge that did not exceed 10 kg and that had been placed on the ground with a 25-litre container full of sarin. (This could be an attempt to refer to the initially incorrect guess of Postol that a pipe with sarin in it was fractured by an explosive charge. In this case, the pipe would have to be a full 2 m long to contain 25 L. The bent pipe observed in the crater is considerably shorter than 2 m in length. If the speculated source of the sarin release was in fact pipe of roughly 1 m length, it would have only carried about 10 L of sarin. However, this speculation was proven wrong by our supercomputer calculations reported in the accompanying manuscript. The scenario of an artillery rocket warhead, which has an explosive cylindrically shaped charge with a large ratio of length to diameter, and oriented during detonation at an angle of roughly 45 to 65° relative to horizontal, instead gives an exact replica of the crater.) This is examined in further detail in the sections below.

Bombing of a house taken over by a non-State armed group

35. In connection with the third scenario, witness statements refer to reports of a house in Khan Shaykhun being taken over by a non-State armed group and used thereafter for the storage of ammunition and barrels. The Mechanism identified the location of the house, which corresponded to the second plume shown in the video filmed between 0642 and 0652 hours that morning. Analysis of satellite imagery revealed that damage caused to the roof of the house had occurred between 21 February and 6 April 2017. (This refers to the before and after satellite photos that show no evidence of bomb damage from 500 to 1000 pound bombs – see page 15 in attachment-. Based on the size of bomb debris cloud, the expected damage in these photos should be a totally demolished building. Explosive rocket damage to a building from a small munition is observable in the satellite and drone photos of the area around the crater in the asphalt road. See images on pages 5, 8, and 10 in attachment. This damage, along with two additional easily visible craters in the satellite and drone photos was not found or reported by the JIM analysts. There is a serious question about how the JIM missed three out of four of the munitions hit locations that are so visible in images. The question remains how did they find evidence of bomb damage where there was none but no evidence of bomb damage where there were multiple craters and building damage from explosive impacts?) Original photographs provided by witnesses interviewed by the Mechanism also showed damage to the roof and front of the house. An independent expert engaged by the Mechanism found that the damage to the house was consistent with an explosion being caused by an air-delivered thermobaric bomb or fuel-air explosives. Samples taken by the Syrian Arab Republic from the site of the house at a later date were not found to contain traces of sarin or its degradation products.
36. The Mechanism has found no information indicating that sarin was released from this location on the morning of 4 April 2017. The Mechanism found no other information related to that scenario.

Bombing of a warehouse on the eastern outskirts of Khan Shaykhun

37. The Mechanism also conducted investigations with respect to the possibility that sarin may have been released following the bombing of a building on the eastern outskirts of Khan Shaykhun at around noon on 4 April 2017. The location, referred to in some public statements as a terrorist ammunition depot, appears to be a building used by the Syria Civil Defence as a medical site on the eastern outskirts of Khan Shaykhun. Apart from the fact that victims of the sarin incident earlier that morning had been treated there, the Mechanism did not link that location to the release of sarin.

Impact location

38. In accordance with the first two scenarios investigated by the Mechanism, the crater is the point of impact of either of the following: (a) an aerial bomb dropped from an airplane, thus dispersing sarin; or (b) an undefined mechanism, linked to the dispersion of sarin, that exploded on the surface of the road.
39. The impact location was determined to be the site identified by the Fact-Finding Mission as being to the west of grain silos in the northern part of Khan Shaykhun. Samples taken from the crater and its surroundings were found by the Fact-Finding Mission to contain sarin. (Of course, there was clearly sarin on the goat and sarin was almost certainly planted elsewhere around the crater.)

40. The Mechanism collected multiple photographs and videos of the crater from witnesses and open sources, as well as satellite imagery from a provider contracted by the Mechanism. Using those materials, forensic institutes engaged by the Mechanism determined that the crater is located at approximately 35°26'59.75"N, 36°38'55.91"E. (IMPORTANT: There was also a second crater 150 m north northeast at 35°27'03.31N; 36°38'59.08"E and third crater 180 m north northeast at 35°27'03.90"N; 36°39'00.48"E. In addition, there was bomb damage to the concrete roof panel of the grain storage warehouse at 35°27'00.56"N; 36°39'00.48"E, 130 m east of the crater where the JIM alleges there was a sarin release. See images on pages 5, 8, and 10 of the attachment at the end of this annotated document. A question remains why these craters and the damage to the warehouse concrete roof panel were not discovered by JIM investigators when they allegedly searched the videos for evidence. If there was a serious investigation by the JIM investigators, missing these craters is inexplicable.)
41. In order to identify other points of impact possibly associated with the release of sarin, the Mechanism commissioned the forensic analysis of video footage taken between 0642 and 0652 hours on 4 April that showed four plumes across Khan Shaykhun, three of which had been located approximately 320 m south-west of the crater and the fourth approximately 1.3 km south-south-west of the crater, one of which had been shorter and whiter than the others. None of the locations from which the plumes had emanated could be associated with the location of the crater.
42. Expert analysis of satellite imagery available to the Mechanism that had been taken of Khan Shaykhun on 21 February 2017 and 6 April 2017 was carried out to identify signs of damaged structures and craters in the area correlating to the locations of the plumes. The Mechanism found that at least three of those locations were buildings that appeared to have been damaged by a thermobaric bomb or fuel-air explosives. (The plumes observed from a distance of kilometers indicate the explosion of bombs that are in the 500 to 1000 pound range. Since there is no evidence of damage to the buildings in the satellite photos, it is totally ridiculous for the JIM report to suggest that nonexistent damage in the before and after photographs has been identified as being produced by a thermobaric bomb or fuel air explosive. This absurd embellishment raises the most serious questions about the credentials and expert-knowledge of the munitions experts used by the JIM.) Damage to a building was observed in the general vicinity of the shorter plume, which appeared to have been created between the aforementioned dates. Therefore, the Mechanism could not conclusively determine that the building had been bombed on 4 April 2017.
43. The cause of the plume that was shorter and whiter in appearance than the other three could not be conclusively identified by munitions experts engaged by the Mechanism. (We need to know exactly who these "munitions experts" are) Two experts noted that the plume had probably consisted of aerosolized droplets of liquid. One explained that the plume's appearance might indicate the use of a vacuum bomb that had possibly failed to explode, with the plume being a cloud of explosive liquid that had disseminated from the munition. (WHAT!) – (The video images of the bomb clouds look exactly like those from standard 500 or 1000 pound bombs! If the munition's experts observed the bombs as they detonated near the ground, a fuel air explosive detonation cloud would initially appear like a luminous pancake-shaped debris cloud that would then rise to higher altitudes and look very much like a debris cloud from a standard explosion. A thermobaric explosion is made up of oxygen-poor explosives and exhibits a high level of afterburning when it detonates. This burning is easily identified by the high luminosity of the early detonating debris cloud, but later in the process, this cloud also rises in to higher altitudes very much like the cloud from a standard munition. If this claim is true, it means that the munitions experts observed the initial explosions of these weapons. We do not believe that there is any evidence of such early observations of the detonations. The JIM should be able to produce the visual evidence of such an arbitrarily elaborated technical claim.)
44. Although the plumes cannot be associated with the crater, they indicate that an aerial attack occurred in Khan Shaykhun on the morning of 4 April 2017.

Crater analysis

45. As the site where the sarin was released on the morning of 4 April 2017 was of particular importance to the investigation, the Mechanism undertook extensive efforts to collect photographs and videos of the location and to obtain expert analysis of its characteristics from several independent sources.
46. Original video footage and photographs of the impact location taken early in the morning on 4 April 2017 by a witness interviewed by the Mechanism, which were determined by a forensic institute to have been recorded between 0804 and 0917 hours, showed the crater and a deformed piece of metal protruding from it. The crater was estimated by forensic experts to have a diameter of approximately 1.5 to 1.65 m and a depth of between 42 and 51 cm. (was this "expert" Eyal Weizman?) The videos and photographs showed the crater to contain debris of rock and asphalt, fragments of metal and a circular metal object that appeared to be a munition filler cap. (Interesting description. The "object" is unambiguously a pipe, see image in the attachment at the top of page 7, yet nowhere in the entire JIM report is there a pipe of any kind referred to.

This creates the appearance that the JIM is doing everything it can to avoid identifying the object as obviously being a pipe. In fact, the images in the attachment show that the pipe is stuck in the ground at the front of the crater in a near vertical position and bent forward. This is the critical prediction of the supercomputer calculations published in the accompanying manuscript. A description of how the pipe becomes lodged into the ground and bent forward during the process of rocket arrival is described on page 6 of the attachment at the end of this annotated document. Nonetheless, the pipe is always described as an object and the entire focus of the JIM's analysis is on a piece of metal that looks like a filler cap. It is as if an alien was searching for proof of life on earth, and after finding an elephant and ant, only focused on the ant as proof of life.) Remnants of green paint were observed on both the deformed piece of metal and the filler cap.

47. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic provided the Mechanism with a report setting forth a series of observations about the crater. In the report, the Government concluded that the shape and characteristics of the crater and the lack of physical evidence did not indicate that it had been the result of an air strike. It was noted that the shape, depth and contents of the crater were not consistent with the effects of an aerial bomb, but rather indicated that it had been the result of a ground explosion produced using a device weighing no more than 10 kg. In support

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of its position, **the Government referred to the incompleteness of the debris of the alleged explosion and the absence of any residues of the bomb or rocket, including a rocket motor, tail or fins. (Of course there were no tailfins – because there was no bomb.** The spent rocket motor casing was bent forward as its front-end encountered the forward wall of the crater – which acted like a pivot – while the back end of the motor casing continued forward like a pole vaulter does when the front end of the pole is placed in the catch. As the front-end of the rocket motor became lodged against the front wall of the crater, the motor casing flipped sharply forward with enough force that it was bent into the forward direction. See discussion at the top of page 6 of the attachment at the end of this annotated document. This process is clearly and unambiguously shown in the supercomputer calculations for a rocket with an explosive warhead hitting the ground. A cursory inspection of the forward pointing end of the rocket motor casing (that is the pipe) clearly shows that something was ripped off the back. That was the tailfin and nozzle section of the spent rocket motor.) It was also stated that three pieces from an unknown source had been deliberately placed, including the remnants of an alleged shell. The Government stated that that confirmed that the scene had been fabricated to suggest that the crater had resulted from the explosion of an aerial bomb. **It was also noted in the report that the crater and its surroundings had contained traces of live agent (sarin) and its degradation products, which had been found 10 days after the alleged attack, indicating that the explosion had not led to the dispersion of the full contents of the sarin container, and that the explosion had not been well calculated.** (According to the Leadership Panel there was so much sarin in the ground that 10 days later it was possible to collect samples that the UN could detect. Yet again, one day after the release of this large amount of sarin, people could be digging without protective clothing and gas masks in the crater without any ill effects.)

48. **The Mechanism obtained expert analysis of the characteristics of the crater from three independent, internationally recognized institutes with specialization in the areas of forensics, defence and security, as well as by two individual independent experts in energetic materials.** (In view of the supercomputer calculations, and the extensive information in UN and US Army Field Artillery Manuals about the shapes of craters produced by artillery rockets, these claims will really need to be explained by the JIM.)
49. **A defence research institute with expertise in high explosives and related materials noted that the site appeared to have been disturbed after impact. Nevertheless, it found indications that the ground had been hit by a substantially heavy object that had travelled at high velocity.** (As shown by our calculations, (which we are fully prepared to present to the UN) the speed of impact of the alleged bomb could at most have been between 200 and 300 mph. Racing cars hit barriers at comparable speeds. This is not an extremely high speed impact) While it could not rule out the idea that the crater had been caused by other means, **it stated that indications of the detonation of a high explosive on the ground were not visible.** (If the munitions experts knew about the contents of a typical Artillery Officers Manuals, they would have immediately recognized the shape of the crater was exactly the same as craters produced by the detonation of an artillery shell or an artillery rocket. See page 4 of the attachment for a discussion about the shape of craters produced by artillery rockets. The reference shown in the image is from the UN manual, *Verification of Minefields, Explosive Remnants of War and Crater Analysis*)
50. Another specialist forensic institute examined photographs and videos of the crater. In considering what had caused the crater, the institute stated that the damage was consistent with that of an impact from an unguided aerial bomb, possibly containing a small bursting charge. **It explained that that conclusion was based on the evidence showing that there had been very little damage around the crater caused by fragmentation of the munition casing and no significant damage to structures near the crater due to blast overpressure.** (Any real expert on munitions would have known that the fragmentation of an artillery shell would be in a direction different from the only structure nearby – which was an electric power station. This information about the fragmentation pattern of a rocket artillery shell is contained in UN and US Army Artillery Officer Field Manuals. Also, a very simple impulse calculation (which we are fully prepared to present to the UN) would have told the munitions expert that the outer wall of the power station would be strong enough to not buckle if the charge is roughly 6 to 10 kg. As noted by the JIM itself, a charge of 6 to 10 kg would produce a crater of essentially the size of that observed in the photographs and videos. This serious error in analysis suggests that either the experts did not do a simple calculation or the individuals involved did not have the expertise that has been ascribed to them.) The institute also observed that the use of a ground-launched munition was unlikely, as no remnants peculiar to a rocket had been evident in the crater or found in its vicinity. (This again raises serious questions about the credibility of the

JIM's investigative process. There are clear images of a pipe that is roughly 122 mm in diameter in the crater. Nowhere in the JIM report is this pipe referred to as anything but an "object." In spite of the lack of precision associated with describing a 122 mm pipe as an "object," the pipe diameter is the standard for artillery rockets and should certainly have been recognized as such by any true expert on munitions.)

51. One of the individual experts noted that the impact location was a section of paved road very close to which a **metal cabinet** was situated. (The **"metal cabinet"** referred to here is an **electrical substation**. This failure to recognize what this structure is and what it means is the equivalent of not recognizing that a vehicle adjacent to an explosion is a tank rather than a compact car. An electrical substation studied by one of the authors of our manuscript was constructed from 3.5 mm thick metal sheets, which would have easily been able to take the blast pressure from 6 or 10 kg of detonating explosives at 5 to 6 m range – we have done a full and comprehensive analysis of this question and are prepared to provide it to the UN. Anyone who is a true expert on munitions and their effects would have recognized immediately that the cabinet is a highly armored electrical substation) **As no significant impacts or holes were visible in the plates of the metal cabinet, the impact was consistent with that of a liquid-filled bomb that had a thin shell and contained a very limited amount of explosive in its bursting charge.** (It looks like not a single expert used by the JIM did a single calculation or carefully examined the evidence.) The expert found that the appearance of the crater indicated that the pavement had been hit by a relatively large object at high velocity, without a large amount of explosives being involved. (Did the expert estimate the weight and velocity of the "object" that hit at "high velocity." We have estimated the aerodynamic characteristics of the postulated bomb and calculated its speed of impact, which could at most be between 300 to 450 km/h (200 and 300 mph). Racing cars hit barriers at comparable speeds. This is *not* a high enough speed to shatter large pieces of metal that would make up the bomb. The metal pieces of the bomb would simply be bent and spread out around the crater. This is exactly the type of pieces of debris that were seen around the craters after the nerve agent attack of August 21, 2013 in Ghouta. In that case, the rocket propelled munitions hit the ground at essentially the same speed as would a 300 to 450 kg bomb. See image on the bottom of page 7 of the attachment at the end of this annotated document for an example of debris left around an impact crater produced by a rocket-propelled sarin bomb that hit the ground at the same speed as the bomb postulated by the JIM experts.)

52. With regard to the suggestion that the crater might have been caused by an explosive charge placed on the ground, the expert noted that that was contradicted by the following: (a) the appearance of the edges of the surrounding pavement, where little fragmentation was seen; (b) **the absence of an elevated rim around the crater**; (The lack of an elevated rim around the crater is irrelevant. The supercomputer calculations do not predict an elevated rim. This is probably the result of the low weight of the explosive charge and the tampering effect of the dense and cohesive asphalt surface at the edge of the crater. This is yet another technical embellishment from an expert that raises questions about the expertise of the individual.) (c) the relatively few cracks in the pavement around the crater; and (d) the existence of objects buried deep in the crater. The expert also dismissed the suggestion that the crater might have been created by excavation and the emplacement of the objects found therein, on account of the following: (a) the jagged appearance of the edges; (b) the radial cracks formed in the pavement;

(c) the depth at which the objects were buried in the crater; and (d) the lack of any sign of the tools used to excavate the crater, which would have left marks on its edges. The expert concluded that it was very unlikely that the crater had been caused by a ground-launched weapon, an explosive charge or a liquid -filled warhead emplaced on the ground, or excavation and the emplacement of the objects found therein.

(As with all the other experts quoted by the JIM, the pipe bent forward in the crater is completely ignored, the shape of the crater is completely ignored, the fact that there were two other craters and explosive damage to the roof of an adjacent warehouse is ignored – and not reported to the UN Security Council. See pages 8, 9, and 10 in the attachment. The fact that the additional craters and roof damage are in the line of fire indicated by the shape of the crater at issue was ignored, and the fact that there was ABSOLUTELY NO large pieces of metal – strips of thin metal associated with the thin walled casing of the alleged bomb, thick plates that would be on the front and back of the bomb, and a rugged tailfin to orient the bomb during its fall – did not raise any concerns among the JIM experts. These statements are yet another indicator that there were no real experts on munitions and their effects involved in this investigation. It also indicates no true expert was involved in the review of the final report before it was transmitted to the UN Security Council.)

53. The expert examined the dimensions and shape of the crater and analysed whether it was consistent with the use of various types of bombs and rockets. **The expert concluded that the type of munition most likely to have caused the crater was a relatively large bomb with a mass of 300 to 450 kg. (!!!)** The shape of the crater, which was relatively circular, **(the crater was neither circular nor symmetric – it was deeper at one end and shallow at the other – the rim was tear-shaped – the narrow end of the tear-shape was pointing in the direction of the arrival of the rocket, and was also directly along the line of arrival of two other fresh craters that may indicate they were also created by similar rockets launched from the same location. All one needs is the information in any Artillery Officers Field Manual (or the UN's own manuals for peacekeeping soldiers) to understand that the experts got it all wrong. See image at top of page 7 and pages 8, 9, and 10 in the attachment)**

[SPECIAL NOTE – 300 to 450 kg bomb could carry 250 to 300 Liters of sarin, roughly half as much sarin as that delivered in the massive attack on Ghouta of August 21, 2019.]

indicated that the bomb had been dropped from a medium or high altitude, of between approximately 4,000 and 10,000 m. **(This is yet another example of a false and misleading technical embellishment that indicates that the individuals involved in the JIM investigation were not experts. We are prepared to show our computational estimates with the UN on the impact speeds of bombs versus their drop altitudes. We show that if the bomb was dropped from an altitude of about a kilometer it would nearly reach its terminal velocity before it hit the ground. The terminal velocity occurs when the pull of gravity is exactly offset by the aerodynamic drag. In this situation, the object falls at a constant velocity, neither slowing up nor increasing in speed. Since the bomb reaches its terminal velocity after falling only a few kilometers, it will hit the ground at the same speed independent of the actual altitude at which it was released. Thus the claim that the bomb must have been dropped from an altitude of 4 to 10 km is a completely fabricated technical embellishment that no truly knowledgeable technical expert would ever make. This is important because it raises yet another question about the competence of the expert that is being quoted, and also whether any expert was involved in reviewing the final JIM report before it was transmitted to the UN Security Council.)** Experts agreed that the crater was unlikely to have been caused by high explosives, **as there were too few visible signs of damage caused by fragmentation or overpressure, especially on the metal cabinet located 3 to 5 m away from the crater.** (The crater was roughly 5 to 5.7 m from the forward end of the cabinet wall. This can be deduced from the crater dimensions and the image on the top left on page 9 in the attachment. Detailed images with full dimensional overlays are available from us to the UN on request. Any expert would have known that a difference in range between 3 and 5 meters would result in very large differences in the blast overpressure at the wall of the electrical substation. At three meters range the peak blast overpressure at the wall of the electrical substation would be about ten times larger than at 5 meters. Since a true expert would have known of the high sensitivity of the blast impulse to range from the target, they would have performed a careful analysis of the distances from the crater center to the wall of the electrical substation before pronouncing a conclusion about the potential for damage from blast. This was obviously not done. It is also clear that the expert did not know that the “cabinet” was an electrical substation. Electrical substations are mass produced to extremely high standards of strength, so as to reduce their vulnerability to tampering and other adverse environmental conditions. If the expert had any knowledge of the target they would have known that the front wall of the substation should be sufficiently strong to not have been bent by the blast wave. Also, if they had any knowledge of the fragmentation pattern associated with an explosive artillery shell or artillery rocket warhead, they would have also known that the fragments from the exploding munition would have not been directed toward the electrical substation. Our analysis of blast and fragmentation effects from an artillery rocket detonation near the substation can be provided on request from the UN. The fact that alleged experts did not do any blast damage calculations and had no knowledge of the fragmentation spray pattern associated with an artillery rocket detonation indicates that there could not have been any true experts on munitions associated with the JIM investigation and final report. This complete absence of actual expertise in a report that was delivered to and acted upon by the UN Security Council based on inaccurate descriptions of the data and conclusions that are inconsistent with expert analysis needs to be thoroughly investigated, so as to avoid such serious circumstances in the future.) The expert analysis found that the characteristics of the crater were consistent with the impact of a heavy object travelling at high velocity, probably with a liquid fill. Any

explosion from the bursting charge would be small and, furthermore, the liquid surrounding the bursting charge would have absorbed most of the energy from the explosion. The Mechanism notes that, on the basis of the foregoing, the characteristics of the crater are more likely to have been caused by an aerial bomb with a small explosive charge, and that it probably contained liquid. (More nonsense. If the crater were produced by a falling bomb filled with liquid, the crater would be surrounded by the remnants of the "metal barrel" that would have constituted the bomb. The first question a true expert would have asked if this conclusion was advanced is where are the large metal fragments from the bomb that contained the fluid?)

Munition analysis

54. As described in paragraph 46 above, two objects of interest that were visible in photographs and videos of the crater were analysed by the Mechanism. **These were the filler cap from a chemical munition and a deformed piece of metal protruding from deep within the crater.** (This description is outrightly misleading. The "deformed" piece of metal was a bent pipe of uniform diameter of about 122 mm and a length of about 1 m. See image at top of page 7 in the attachment. The filler cap is perhaps 100 mm in diameter and maybe 10 or 15 mm in thickness. Yet no attention whatsoever is given to the pipe in the JIM analysis and all of the attention is given to a piece of metal that could easily have been simply placed in the crater. Even though the pipe was lodged deep inside the front-end of the crater and bent forward with great force, there is absolutely no attempt to understand how this pipe was so violently driven into the crater! It is as if the entire team of JIM experts were simply sleepwalking on the question of which debris might have been opportunistically placed in the crater and which debris looks like it was involved in the violent production of the crater.)
55. According to information obtained by the Mechanism, the filler cap, with two closure plugs, is uniquely consistent with Syrian chemical aerial bombs. The Mechanism was provided with an assessment of the filler cap and with chemical analysis showing sarin and a reaction product of sarin with hexamine that can be formed only under very high heat. Information was also received that additional metal fragments collected from the crater might correspond to parts of Syrian aerial chemical munitions. (Hexamine is a heating material that is commonly used in the Middle East. It has nothing to do with sarin or the production of sarin. In the nerve agent attack of August 21, 2013 in Ghouta, hexamine was sometimes found in soil samples with no sarin or sarin decay products and sometimes was found in soil samples with sarin and sarin decay products. If hexamine were used as the acid scavenger in the production of this sarin, sarin or sarin decay products would never be found without hexamine also being present. The data from the Ghouta attack unambiguously indicates that hexamine and sarin were independently introduced into the environment and had nothing to do with each other. This theory of hexamine was introduced by a member of the Bellingcat organization, Dan Kaszeta, who has been shown to have misrepresented himself as an expert on nerve agents and to have made false claims about statements made by Åka Sellström, who was the head of the UN OPCW investigation of the nerve agent attack at Ghouta. We have documentation that shows that Mr. Kaszeta and Bellingcat have been pushing the idea that hexamine is the acid scavenger associated with the production of sarin by the Syrian Arab Republic. The data that they used was the UN data from the Ghouta event, which they did not understand, shows that both of these materials were spread in separate events. Does this claim about hexamine indicate that Bellingcat played a significant role as an expert in the JIM report? This is an important question, since the findings in the JIM report closely parallel those fabricated in numerous published reports by Bellingcat. If it turns out individuals from or associated with Bellingcat are some of the experts used by the JIM expert team, this will indicate serious problems with the vetting of experts by the JIM management)
56. The two energetic-materials experts engaged by the Mechanism reported that the size and thickness of the metal piece protruding from the crater indicated that it had been the casing of an aerial bomb measuring between 300 and 500 mm in diameter. (According to this assessment, the only remnant from this bomb is a sheet of metal from the exterior of the thin-walled bomb. According to the experts associated with the JIM report, during the process of impact, this sheet of metal was rolled up into a pipe of uniform diameter of roughly 122 mm while it was also rotated vertically and propelled into the ground at the front end of the crater and bent forward into the direction of arrival of the munition. The JIM provides no physical explanation of how this complex and convoluted set of events, reminiscent of a Rube Goldberg cartoon, occurred. The alternative explanation, which is supported in detail by the results of our supercomputer calculations, is that the empty rocket motor casing, which was in the shape of a pipe, hit the ground like a pole vaulters shaft and flipped forward because the front end of shaft was stuck in the crater while the aft-end was free to rotate. This is the alternative explanation that is produced from a fundamental physical calculation. The evidence for this obvious explanation is elaborated on and shown pages 6 and 7 of the attachment)

57. The munition remnants recovered from the crater by unidentified individuals are assessed as being associated with an air-delivered chemical bomb. Specific munition remnants, particularly the tailfin, could not be recovered. The absence of a chain of custody relating to the munition remnants diminishes their probative value. (The analysis has determined that the tailfins and the front and back plates were removed from the scene, in order to explain why there is no debris at the scene. In this case, the JIM seems to be claiming that the absence of physical evidence indicates that an aerial bomb produced the crater. If this is the standard of evidence, then all explanations become equally valid.)
58. The Syrian Arab Republic provided information to the Mechanism suggesting that the release of sarin had been associated with an above-ground explosion, which is reflected in the second scenario examined by the Mechanism. According to the government report, the point of impact had been the result of a ground explosion using an explosive charge that did not exceed 10 kg of trinitrotoluene (TNT) and that had been placed on the ground with a 25 -litre container full of sarin. (In fact, our calculations show that a significant crater would *not* be formed by 10 kg of TNT placed on top of a pipe. This is because the standoff distance between the ground and the TNT would greatly reduce the cratering efficiency of the detonating charge. This can be seen in images published in our manuscript.) The Government also noted that the fact that the crater and its surroundings had contained traces of sarin and its degradation products 10 days after the incident proved that the explosion had not dispersed all the sarin in the container, which meant that the explosion had not been well calculated.
59. The Mechanism also requested the two individual experts, forensic institutes and defence institutes to examine whether an explosive device placed on the ground could have caused the crater. The forensic institutes and the experts in energetic materials ruled out the idea that an improvised explosive device placed underground

would have created such a crater. This was based on the characteristics of the crater and the lack of substantial cracks and radial detonation marks of blast products on the surface surrounding it.

60. With respect to whether such a device might have been placed on the surface of the road, they **determined that it would have needed to contain an equivalent of 10 kg of TNT or 12 kg of ammonium nitrate fuel oil.** (This conclusion is absolutely consistent with what our super computer calculations show, and it is also absolutely consistent with widely available tabulated data on craters for surface bursts) **The experts generally ruled out that possibility, because such an explosion would have caused much more damage to the surroundings than what had been observed.** (As already noted, a simple blast-impulse calculation and the knowledge that the cabinet was a highly reinforced structure (an electrical substation) would have shown this finding to be wrong) **The two experts in energetic materials also noted that the metal object protruding from the crater was too large and too deeply embedded for the improvised explosive device scenario to be likely.** (CORRECT! But did they note that the metal object was a 122mm pipe that was roughly one meter long? Nowhere in this report is the geometry "metal object" described as a pipe.)
61. Further to the statements of witnesses that they saw and heard aircraft, **the observations with potentially the most probative value**, namely, those of **the forensic institutes and individual experts, indicate that the crater was most likely caused by an unguided air-delivered bomb.** (We do not believe that any individuals who are truly experts or forensic institutions that have actually been involved in the details of this investigation would reach this conclusion. See pages 4, 5, 6, and 7 in the attachment at the end of this annotated document. Given all of the egregious and amateurish errors associated with the alleged assertions from "forensic institutes and individual experts" we find it implausible that this report was produced from expert input as described.)
62. **On the basis of the lack of characteristics that would be expected following an explosion produced by an explosive charge placed on the ground, the Mechanism notes that the munition used would more likely have been an aerial bomb.** (Again, this claim, supposedly derived from the analysis of the "forensic institutes and individual experts" is not just wrong, it is completely without technical merit.)

Dispersion of sarin

63. Sarin of an undefined purity was disseminated from the crater in a direction that was defined by local air movements. The Mechanism noted that the wind speed in the area that day had been <0.5 m/s, which would normally result in a considerable variation in the direction of the air movement. The Mechanism also noted that the location of victims, as described in the report of **the Fact-Finding Mission, serves as an indicator of prevailing air movements west to south-west of the location of the crater during the early morning on 4 April 2017.** (If the wind direction was west to southwest, then why are the bomb debris clouds in the videos moving to the east! See image at the bottom of page 11 in the attachment. The JIM emphasizes that they determine *with certainty* that the videos and photographs of the bomb debris clouds were taken on April 4 – but on April 4 the JIM now claim that the wind was going to west to southwest rather than east. How do they explain these inconsistencies?)
64. A defence research institute with expertise in dispersion modelling was commissioned by the Mechanism to determine the likely amount of sarin released and its impact on the number of victims poisoned. In conducting the modelling, the defence research institute took into account certain factors specific to Khan Shaykhun, such as its population and local weather conditions. (Since the particular defence research institute "took into account certain factors specific to Khan Shaykhun, such as its population and local weather conditions" the JIM should be able to explain how the wind was going to west to southwest and at the same time to the east. Also, how do they explain the fact that at that time the wind direction reported for Khan Sheikhoun was to the West?)
65. **While no firm conclusion as to the amount of sarin used in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 could be established, the institute noted that, if the same quantity of sarin were used, an aerial bomb would be expected to deposit smaller amounts of sarin on the ground than an explosive charge placed directly on the ground.** (This observation is totally meaningless and contradicts the earlier claims made by the JIM that 150 to 250 L of sarin were contained in the bomb. If the bomb hit the ground, then it did not function as designed – as an airburst. It is completely unclear what this report is trying to say here. Simple estimates of evaporation rates of sarin from the ground lead to the conclusion that an evaporating pond of 200 to 300 L sarin could easily cause severe exposure to individuals a kilometer or more down range assuming a relatively low wind speed of 1 to 2 m/s. If instead a large part of the sarin was dispersed into the air, the cloud would contain many tens of kilograms of sarin. Such a cloud, containing according to

the JIM, perhaps 50kg of sarin, could be lethal well-beyond a range of 1 km downwind. Yet the JIM reports a toxic zone to a range of only about 375 meters. The assumptions behind the calculations by the "defence research institute" calculations need to be clarified to determine their credibility.)

66. The observation made by the Syrian Arabic Republic that traces of live agent (sarin) could be observed, 10 days after the incident, in the crater area and the area near the silos 80 m to the east of the crater may be explained by the amount of sarin deposited on the ground at the time of its release.

(IMPORTANT: the JIM in part bases its conclusion that an aerial bomb was dropped because sarin could be found 10 days later 80 m from the crater. Yet the JIM does not explain how unprotected individuals could be taking samples inside the crater one day after the attack. Also, the JIM also appears to state that large amounts of sarin could have been injected into the air during alleged bomb impact.) The Mechanism therefore compared the amounts of sarin that would be deposited on the ground by the following: (a) a chemical aerial bomb; and (b) an improvised explosive device for dispersion. A chemical aerial bomb releasing 150 to 250 litres of sarin and depositing 10 to 15 per cent of its contents on the ground would deposit more sarin on the ground than an improvised explosive device containing 25 litres of sarin. (If the bomb deposited 15% of its contents on the ground then 85% of its contents were deposited into the air. This means 120 to 200 kg of sarin would have been dispersed into a cloud that would have drifted downwind. Such a cloud could easily deliver lethal doses of sarin to ranges well in excess of 2 km downwind. The inconsistencies in this description are not consistent with analysis that would be produced by experts. The JIM concludes that between 15 and 30 litres of sarin was deposited into the ground at the time the crater was formed. This appears to suggest that the remaining 85 to 90% of the sarin was in a cloud that drifted downwind. A very rudimentary calculation shows that such a cloud, which according to the JIM's assumptions would be carrying carrying many tens of kilograms of aerosolized and evaporated sarin. Such a cloud could be deadly at several kilometers range downwind. In reality, sarin evaporates at a relatively low rate (its vapor pressure at 20°C is roughly 300 Pa). This low evaporation rate is typically why it is dispersed as droplets from altitudes of hundreds of meters. The strategy for spreading it is to create droplets of many different sizes with many different fall rates that will be carried to different distances downwind. In fact, if a sarin-containing bomb failed to disperse the sarin at the planned for altitude and instead hit the ground, almost all of the sarin would be initially spread on the ground around the impact point. In this case, 24 hours later, individuals without any protection could not possibly be digging in the crater without any ill effects from sarin trapped in the near surface ground soil. At the same time the JIM speculates that only 10 to 15% of the sarin is deposited on the ground, they conclude that the sarin deposition into the ground was still so large that that it resulted in sarin being detected 10 days later at 80 m from the crater. Which of these different scenarios is correct?) The Mechanism notes that, in either case, sarin would have been dispersed into the general environment, as has been confirmed by the analysis of environmental samples.

67. The above analysis supports the scenario of an aerial bombde positing a larger amount of sarin on or into the ground than would be deposited by an improvised explosive device containing 25 litres of sarin.

Medical effects and response

68. While noting the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission, the Mechanism collected and reviewed information from a range of sources concerning the medical effects on and treatment administered to persons in Khan Shaykhun following the incident, including open sources, interviews with victims and medical personnel, and a review of medical records. The Mechanism collected and analysed that information to determine the impact of the incident on the community, in particular its emergency response and health-care sector.
69. In reports from open sources in the immediate aftermath of the incident, it was noted that victims in Khan Shaykhun appeared to show symptoms consistent with exposure to organophosphorus chemicals also expressed as a neurotoxic agent. In addition, open sources reported that chlorine might also have been released, as indicated by the smell of bleach. While the Mechanism could not rule out the possibility of the use of chlorine, it focused its investigative efforts on the use of sarin.
70. On the basis of medical records and witness statements, the Fact-Finding Mission identified approximately 100 fatalities and at least 200 other casualties who had survived acute exposure. Such an event in a town the size of Khan Shaykhun would constitute quite a challenge for a society already in distress. There are four critical immediate recourses that should be available in a mass -casualty incident involving sarin poisoning: (a) adequate decontamination to stop exposure and protect rescue and health-care staff from secondary contamination; (b) assisted ventilation, either mechanical or manual, after intubation; (c) sufficient administration of the primary antidotes atropine and pralidoxime; and (d) ample capacity for the transport of patients so that their needs can be met.
71. The Mechanism ascertained that more than 10 health-care facilities in Khan Shaykhun, Idlib Governorate and a neighbouring country had become involved in providing health care to those affected by the incident. According to reports, doctors were struggling amid extreme shortages, including of the antidotes used to save patients. There were also reports that most of the fatalities had died before they had reached the hospitals.
72. The Mechanism found that the reported symptoms of the victims were consistent with exposure to sarin and that the available information on the medical impact of the attack on 4 April 2017, including the response of the health -care sector, consistently pointed to the use of sarin.
73. On the basis of its review of open-source material showing first responders in the hours immediately after the incident, the Mechanism observed several methods and procedures that appeared to be either unusual or inappropriate in the circumstances. In particular, **the Mechanism noted that fully equipped hazmat teams had appeared at the scene** (the video cited by the JIM unambiguously show completely unprotected individuals collecting samples one day after the alleged release. Videos also show Turkish ambulance crews that were sent from Turkey on the day of the attack in hazmat gear, which are equipped with gas masks that have filters. The videos do not show any evidence of illness in the Turkish aid workers, in spite of the fact in some of the videos the workers are seen to be in hazmat suits but not wearing their gas masks.) Later that afternoon and reported early detection of the presence of sarin, apparently using a Dräger X -am 7000 ambient air monitor, which was not known to be able to detect sarin. **Of additional concern to the Mechanism was the relatively unprofessional manner in which certain environmental samples appear to have been taken, for example, sampling from a muddy puddle.** (We have seen these videos – the individuals involved were not equipped with hazmat. This can be independently verified by the reader by simply looking at images at the end of this section that have been extracted from videos cited by the JIM. One of the individuals who was in charge of organizing the collected samples was completely unprotected and sitting near the crater during the sample collection operation. There are a very large number of videos showing unprotected individuals at the site a day after the attack. It is hard to understand how nobody in the JIM found this video evidence to be an indication that the crater was not drenched with sarin only a day before.)
74. The Mechanism also noted scenes recorded just after the incident at the medical site to the east of Khan Shaykhun, where rescue and decontamination activities filmed shortly after 0700 hours showed rescue personnel indiscriminately hosing down patients with water for extended periods of time. That video footage also showed a number of patients not being attended to, as well as paramedical interventions that did not seem to make medical sense, such as performing cardiac compression on a patient who was lying face down.

75. The Mechanism was provided with expert analysis regarding the medical symptoms and responses indicated in witness statements and medical records, as well as the treatment received at a range of health-care facilities, including those in a neighbouring country.
76. Certain irregularities were observed in elements of the information analysed. For example, several hospitals appeared to have begun admitting casualties of the attack between 0640 and 0645 hours. The Mechanism received the medical records of 247 patients from Khan Shaykhun who had been admitted to various health-care facilities, including survivors and a number of victims who eventually died from exposure to a chemical agent. The admission times noted in the records range from 0600 to 1600 hours. Analysis of the records revealed that in 57 cases, patients had been admitted to five hospitals before the incident (at 0600, 0620 and 0640 hours). In 10 of those cases, patients appear to have been admitted to a hospital 125 km away from Khan Shaykhun at 0700 hours, while another 42 patients appear to have been admitted to a hospital 30 km away at 0700 hours. **The Mechanism did not investigate those discrepancies and cannot determine whether they are linked to any possible staging scenario or are the result of poor record-keeping in chaotic conditions.** (The indications of staging are extensive and glaring in the physical data and the videos – why focus on only this? The Mechanism did not investigate ANY of the major discrepancies in the physical data and video records that indicate staging of the event (dead goat with drag marks behind it, dead birds at the crater in bird cages, dead birds at the crater being unloaded from bird cages into sample bags), so why are they citing these small discrepancies?)
77. An inconsistency was identified in one of the Fact-Finding Mission's biomedical results from samples lacking a chain of custody. In sample No. 13,¹ the blood sample tested negative for sarin or a sarin-like substance, while the urine sample tested positive for the sarin degradation product isopropyl methylphosphonate. There is currently no explanation for the inconsistency. Medical experts consulted by the Mechanism indicated that the combination of the negative result in the blood and the positive result in the urine was impossible. That inconsistency was considered to be most likely the result of cross-contamination in the sampling process.
78. The Mechanism observed from open sources that the treatment administered to victims from Khan Shaykhun had frequently involved oxygen and cortisone therapy. Such treatment is not recommended for sarin poisoning, but is recommended mainly for lung damage, as would be caused by either chlorine or vacuum bombs.
79. On the basis of its consultations with two medical experts, the Mechanism found that the response carried out by rescue workers and medical personnel in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 had been essentially consistent with the use of sarin on such a scale. While some potentially important irregularities were identified throughout the rescue operation and in medical records, they may be explained by such factors as poor training, the chaotic conditions or attempts to inflate the gravity of the situation for depiction in the media.

Chemistry

80. In order to ascertain the origin of the sarin dispersed in Khan Shaykhun, the Mechanism took steps to identify its components and its possible production methods, including by commissioning studies at an OPCW-designated laboratory.
81. In the course of synthesizing a chemical, not only the desired chemical, but also certain by-products, are formed. If the production of a chemical requires several reaction steps, such by-products are also carried forward as impurities to the next step of the synthesis. Furthermore, impurities may undergo chemical transformation themselves, thus forming new and different impurities. Therefore, the method used for the production of a chemical may be ascertained by identifying the impurities that it contains. Impurities in samples may also link a sample to its

¹ See S/2017/567, table 4.

starting material (precursor) should the impurities in the sample and the precursor match.

82. During the removal of the stockpile belonging to the Syrian Arab Republic in 2014, OPCW collected samples from the sarin precursor methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) before the rest of the stockpile was destroyed. The Mechanism commissioned a laboratory to study and compare the impurities, and their formation, in samples of stockpiled DF. Five different samples from the country's DF stockpile were analysed for impurities. (The OPCW team that studied samples taken in the August 21, 2013 attack in Ghouta did not identify the sarin as produced from Syrian Arab Republic DF. It is clear from this statement that in the case of the Ghouta attack they would have had the ability to determine whether this sarin was produced from Syrian Arab Republic DF.)

83. Environmental samples were collected in Khan Shaykhun both from inside the crater and from its surroundings. The results of the analysis carried out by OPCW - designated laboratories confirm the presence of sarin and some of its known degradation products.² Moreover, the results confirm that sarin was produced by the binary route, in which DF is combined with isopropanol (iPrOH) in the presence of hexamine.

(This claim again raises the question of whether Bellingcat research products have been misrepresented as products of expert analysis in the JIM report. As noted earlier, Bellingcat's involvement in the JIM investigation would indicate that the management overseeing the Jim investigation process had not properly vetted individuals involved for true expertise. The claim that hexamine in environmental samples indicates that it was used as the acid scavenging agent in the binary production of sarin is inconsistent with the data on environmental samples taken by the UN? It is absolutely clear that hexamine was NOT used as the acid scavenging agent in the sarin used in the August 21, 2013 nerve agent attack in Ghouta – as claimed by Bellingcat. The soil samples from Ghouta show sarin remnants in soil samples when hexamine was not present and hexamine when sarin remnants were not present. This indicates that the sarin and the hexamine were deposited into the environment in Ghouta independently. This claim about hexamine somehow being associated as the acid scavenger in the production of the sarin needs to be documented. Note further, hexamine is nearly insoluble in isopropyl alcohol. How was the chemical mixing process conducted? In addition, even if the mixture of DF and isopropyl alcohol was poured into containers filled with hexamine, how would this indicate that the use of hexamine is a standard procedure in the manufacturing of sarin by the Syrian Arab Republic – as claimed by Bellingcat? Is this the UN claim as well? These claims have only been made by the organization Bellingcat, which can be shown to have no expert capabilities.)

84. The five DF samples from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile and the environmental samples from Khan Shaykhun all contained the impurity phosphorus hexafluoride (PF6). The Mechanism studied the significance of PF6 as a "marker chemical" for DF produced by the Syrian Arab Republic. The study tested the conditions for the formation of PF6 in the production of DF, as well as the possibility of its removal from DF. Laboratory experiments showed that PF6 is formed when hydrogen fluoride (HF) is used as a fluorinating agent in the production of DF. (HF is typically used to chemically displace the chlorine in Methylphosphonic dichloride (also called Methanephosphonic acid dichloride). This is the standard practice for producing Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF). This technical embellishment is misleading and has the character of hocus-pocus aimed at making this insight appear important and relevant to investigation findings.)

If a different commonly used fluorinating agent is used, no PF6 is formed. PF6 is also not formed in such DF as a result of long-term storage. Furthermore, the test showed that PF6 cannot be removed through distillation.

85. Two of the five samples from the Syrian Arab Republic DF stockpile contained the impurity phosphorous oxychloride (POCl3). The environmental samples from Khan Shaykhun had two additional types of marker chemicals: isopropyl phosphates and isopropyl phosphorofluoridates. Laboratory tests show that such marker chemicals are formed if DF from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile containing POCl3 is used to make binary sarin. (There is a lot of detail here that is not relevant to the findings of the JIM investigation and could simply be stated as the "sarin contained markers that are known to be produced in Syrian Arab Republic DF")

86. On the basis of the foregoing, the Mechanism concludes that the presence of the marker chemical PF6 is evidence that HF was used to produce the DF that was the precursor for the sarin released in Khan Shaykhun. (And so?) HF is a very aggressive and dangerous gas and therefore is difficult to handle. The use of HF indicates a high degree of competence and sophistication in the production of DF and points to a chemical-plant-type production method. (This statement is a nonsequitur, the production of DF typically uses HF to fluorinate Methylphosphonic dichloride, a precursor chemical that is routinely produced as part of a well-known chain of chemical processes that ultimately produce Methylphosphonyl difluoride.)

87. The samples from Khan Shaykhun contain the three types of marker chemicals described above: PF6, isopropyl phosphates and isopropyl phosphorofluoridates. (Where's the hexamine! It is nearly insoluble in isopropyl alcohol so there should be "tons" of it around if it was used as the acid scavenger in the production of sarin.) Their presence is a strong indicator that the sarin disseminated in Khan Shaykhun was produced from DF from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile.
88. An initial screening of the reports concerning previous incidents of the release of sarin in the Syrian Arab Republic showed that some marker chemicals appeared to be present in environmental samples. This would warrant further study.
89. The presence of marker chemicals that are believed to be unique is a strong indication that the sarin released in Khan Shaykhun, as well as in previous incidents, was produced using DF from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile. (Are they trying to say that these markers were also found by the UN when and analyzed the samples from the August 21, 2013 attack. In that case the UN did not ascribe the produced sarin as produced by the Syrian Arab Republic?)
90. In the light of the marker chemicals identified in the DF and the sarin, which are believed to be unique, (Unique to standard production of sarin or unique to sarin produced by the Syrian Arab Republic?) The Mechanism concludes that the precursor chemical DF,

²See S/2017/756, S/2017/567 and S/2017/440.

which is necessary for the production of binary sarin, is very likely to have originated from the Syrian Arab Republic. **This finding relates only to the origin of the DF used as a precursor, not to those responsible for the dissemination of sarin.** (So all the focus aimed at connecting the DF to possible production by the Syrian Arab Republic is properly caveated by an appropriate acknowledgment that sarin precursor agents could be in the hands of rebel groups! The elaborate discussion about sarin chemistry could simply have stated that markers in the sarin were compatible with the production of sarin by the Syrian Arab Republic AND other major states that produce sarin. It is probable that the profile of these markers is unique to DF produced by the Syrian Arab Republic, and is also distinct relative to the profile of markers in DF produced by either the United States or Russia. This should have been noted so as to clarify the otherwise tedious and less than informative statements about markers.)

III. Assessment and findings by the Leadership Panel

91. In order to determine to the greatest extent feasible those who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017, the Leadership Panel requested that the investigators examine eight possible scenarios regarding how the events had unfolded. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the prevailing scenario that emerged was that sarin had been delivered through an aerial bomb dropped by an airplane. Most of the information collected and analysed by the Mechanism supports that scenario.
92. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that the information that it has obtained constitutes sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:
- (a) Aircraft dropped munitions over Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017; **(NO FORENSIC EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION)**
 - (b) An aircraft of the Syrian Arab Republic was in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;
 - (c) The crater from which the sarin emanated was created on the morning of 4 April 2017;
 - (d) The crater was caused by the impact of an aerial bomb travelling at high velocity; **(NO FORENSIC EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION)**
 - (e) A large number of people were affected by sarin between 0630 and 0700 hours on the morning of 4 April 2017;
 - (f) The number of persons affected by the release of sarin on 4 April 2017, and the fact that sarin reportedly continued to be present at the site of the crater 10 days after the incident, indicate that a large amount of sarin was likely released, which is consistent with its being dispersed through a chemical aerial bomb; **(NO FORENSIC EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION)**
 - (g) The symptoms of the victims and their medical treatment, as well as the scale of the incident, are consistent with large-scale sarin poisoning;
 - (h) The sarin identified in the samples taken from Khan Shaykhun was found to have most likely been made with a precursor (DF) from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic;
 - (i) The irregularities described in the present annex are not of such a nature as to call into question the aforementioned findings.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that the Syrian Arab Republic is responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in the present annex. **(ESSENTIALLY ALL OF THE EXPERT TESTIMONY ON MUNITIONS EFFECTS CITED IN THE JIM'S REPORT OF 26 OCTOBER 2017 CONTAIN FUNDAMENTAL AND BASIC ERRORS – THIS INDICATES THAT THE EXPERT TESTIMONY CITED BY THE LEADERSHIP PANEL WAS NOT BASED ON FINDINGS SUPPORTED BY EXPERT CALCULATIONS AND ANALYSIS, OR THE EXPERTS CITED DID NOT HAVE THE BASIC KNOWLEDGE THAT WOULD QUALIFY THEM AS TRUE EXPERTS, OR THE EXPERT FINDINGS WERE MISREPORTED BY THE LEADERSHIP PANEL.)**

The attachment titled

**Forensic Evidence Cited by the OPCW that
Contradict Its Reported Analysis and Conclusions**

That accompanies this annotated and highlighted
letter of 26 October 2017
can be found in the third accompanying PDF file.

