A Detailed Analysis of the Draft UN Security Council Resolution Proposed by the U.S. Government


(Latest publicly available version, October 23, 2002)

PP1 Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,

PP2 Recognizing the threat Iraq’s noncompliance with Security Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,

Rahul Mahajan [], author of The New Crusade: America’s War on Terrorism []: “Claims of a threat posed by Iraq to international peace and security are entirely untenable. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet refuted Bush’s claims in a letter to the Senate, where he said clearly the threat of an Iraqi WMD attack was virtually nonexistent, except possibly in the eventuality of a U.S. war for ‘regime change.’ Nobody claims Iraq has nuclear weapons, nobody has produced any evidence that Iraq is capable of weaponizing biological agents, and it’s quite clear that Iraq can have no more than a nominal chemical weapons capability. When Tony Blair produced a dossier [] purporting to establish the Iraqi threat, the Labor Party produced a counter-dossier [] and Glen Rangwala produced notes further to the counter-dossier [].

“Blair is nominally of the Labor Party, and the CIA is part of the Executive Branch, so Bush and Blair can’t even get their own people to back up this absurd claim. Even if Iraq had any WMD capacity, nobody has explained why it would risk certain, massive retribution if it either attacked directly or gave weapons to any terrorist organization.” [More about this is available at ]

PP3 Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Mahajan: “This is a dodge the Bush administration has been trying for months now. Obviously, the intent of the language in 678 was to authorize use of ‘all necessary means’ to enforce resolution 660 and subsequent resolutions passed up to the time of passage of 678 [1990]. To claim that 678 gives authorization for use of force against Iraq for all time to come with regard to any subsequent resolution is simply absurd. Furthermore, ‘all necessary force’ legitimizes military force only if negotiation is unsuccessful, and the United States has distinguished itself by a complete lack of interest in negotiation. It won’t even meet with representatives of the Iraqi government.”

PP4 Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,

PP5 Deploring the fact that Iraq has never provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometers, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear weapons, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,

PP6 Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly refused to allow access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), refused to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA in 1998, and for the last three years has failed to provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, as it was first obliged to do pursuant to resolution 687 (1991), and as the Council has repeatedly demanded that it do, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,

Mahajan: “Although it’s true that Iraq has repeatedly restricted access, its degree of compliance is very high — far higher than the compliance of most nations with regard to binding decisions like Security Council resolutions or judgments of the International Court of Justice. Israel, for example, is in violation of numerous Security Council resolutions with no attempt at progress toward compliance []. The United States vetoes Security Council resolutions directed against it, as it did with a resolution against its invasion of Panama, and it completely ignored a ruling by the International Court of Justice to cease its terrorist operations against Nicaragua and to pay $17 billion in restitution [,].”

PP7 Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,

PP8 Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations of Iraq contained therein,

PP9 Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,

PP10 Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA, is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,

PP11 Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary General is a necessary step toward rectifying Iraq’s continued failure to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions,

PP12 Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, agreed in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter,

PP13 Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

PP14 Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

OP1 Decides that Iraq is still, and has been for a number of years, in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

Phyllis Bennis, author of Before and After: U.S. Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis [] and fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies []: “This language is specifically designed to set the stage for a U.S. military attack. Being in ‘material breach’ is the precursor to the Council authorizing military enforcement. The assertion that Iraq ‘is still, and has been’ in material breach is part of the U.S. effort to claim a continuing authorization of the use of force. If the U.S. were serious about determining Iraqi compliance or non-compliance, it would ask the UN inspectors to return immediately to Iraq, and only after they finished their work and reported to the Security Council would the Council make a determination regarding compliance or breach. Washington’s insistence on this term is a major part of the French and Russian opposition to the U.S. proposal.”

Mahajan: “Iraq is certainly technically in ‘material breach’ of the obligations stated in 687 and other resolutions. Its compliance or lack thereof cannot be considered in a vacuum, however — the United States has from the beginning breached both the spirit and the letter of the resolutions creating the inspection regime and of international law. These breaches include its original declaration (affirmed throughout the past decade by officials like Madeleine Albright, Bill Richardson, and even by Bill Clinton) that it would not be bound by 687, but would keep the sanctions on until Saddam was removed from power — the resolution says clearly that sanctions will be lifted after the weapons inspectors are satisfied []. Next, the establishment of the ‘no-fly zones’ violated Iraq’s sovereignty [], something explicitly guaranteed by every Security Council resolution on Iraq. The infiltration of spies into UNSCOM [], the previous weapons inspection commission (openly admitted now by Rolf Ekeus, its first head), was a further violation of the inspections process — and among the information they collected was anything that could help target Saddam Hussein for assassination, in violation of both international law and domestic executive order. With Richard Butler as head of UNSCOM, the U.S. used inspections explicitly to provoke crises, and colluded with him to present a rather innocuous report in December 1998 as a justification for armed attack. Ekeus has noted a pattern of bombing attacks on sites visited by UNSCOM, more evidence that the United States is illegitimately using inspections for its own national purposes. Without a declaration of all these material breaches, it’s impossible to put Iraq’s comparatively trivial breaches in proper perspective.”

OP2 Recalls that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;

Bennis: “The problem is how to define the consequences. Washington uses the term to refer explicitly to military force; for this reason, France and Russia have objected to the use of the term in the new Council resolution. In 1998, when the UN Security Council passed a resolution endorsing Kofi Annan’s negotiated stand-down with Iraq, the resolution called for ‘severest consequences.’ At that time, every Council ambassador except that of the U.S. said explicitly that use of the term did not constitute an automatic authorization of the use of force for any country or group of countries. It did not, they said, include what the Russian ambassador called ‘automaticity.’ The U.S. ambassador, Bill Richardson, alone of all the Council, said, ‘we think it does’ authorize immediate unilateral use of force.”

James Jennings, president of Conscience International, a humanitarian aid organization that has worked in Iraq since 1991: “The word ‘consequences’ used in this paragraph is a code word for war. It is not at all clear that war is warranted over major or minor disputes that may arise over interpretations of Security Council resolutions. This paragraph prejudges the outcome. It would be better for the international community to wait and see if any degree of non-cooperation by Iraq warrants even thinking of going to war. It is eminently possible that such a drastic step, which the U.S. President claims is the last thing he wants to do, would not be desirable or necessary in any case.”

James Paul, executive director of the Global Policy Forum [] which monitors global policy making at the United Nations, is the author of a series of papers [] including “Iraq: the Struggle for Oil” []: “The multi-speak coming from Washington allows the allied leaders, and especially the P-5 [Permanent 5] governments, to put a good face on the deal they are striking with Washington. They don’t want it to appear that war is ‘automatic.’ But everyone understands that war is automatic. If it is not so, why are there emergency plans already in full gear to evacuate non-Iraqis from Iraq, to set up refugee camps for those displaced by the fighting, to rush in food to the starving Iraqi population and (most importantly) to seize and administer the Iraqi oil fields under a U.S. military government. Studies about the legal implications of this latter have been made and it appears that the U.S. will be able to pay for its war and occupation out of the seized oil production, according to sympathetic interpretations of relevant international law. Washington ran a ‘profit’ on the 1991 war, as they extracted more in ‘contributions’ from Kuwait, Saudi, Japan, Germany and others than they actually spent (the term ‘profit’ was used humorously in Washington at the time). Now perhaps they are going to run a ‘profit’ again! But, obviously, George is not talking about that aspect of things!”

OP3 Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, IAEA, and the Security Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;

Bennis: “This seems to be an effort to ensure Iraq’s inability — regardless of intent — to comply with these very stringent terms. This is asking Iraq to essentially do the initial work of the inspection team itself, cataloguing its entire WMD programs as well as programs never included in the earlier demands. The original inspections mandated in resolution 687 did not include, for example, ‘delivery systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons’ etc. Resolution 687 also included only long-range missiles, with a range over 150 km, not ‘all’ ballistic missiles. The terms are significantly stricter here.”

OP4 Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations;

John Quigley, professor of international law at Ohio State University: “This language turns any, even trivial, failing by Iraq into ‘material breach’ that could in turn provide the basis for the Security Council to decide on use of military force against Iraq. It makes no sense to define any breach as ‘material breach.'”

Michael Ratner [], President of the Center for Constitutional Rights [] : “This draft of this Resolution, will, if adopted, be used by the United States as an authorization by it, acting alone and without further UN approval, to go to war with Iraq. It will not, according to the U.S., require another resolution by the UN to go to war. By labeling alleged past violations of the inspection regime as ‘material breaches,’ by deeming any further omissions or non-cooperation by Iraq with any of the new inspection regime as ‘material breaches’ and by repeating the warning of ‘serious consequences’ for past failures, the U.S. will interpret this resolution as a green-light for war…. The U.S. has basically put a gun to the UN and said if you don’t approve, we will do it anyway. That is not approval the UN Charter requires; it is coercion.”

Bennis: “This sets Iraq up with a ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ situation. If they claim they have no WMD material to declare, Washington will find that evidence of the ‘continuing breach’ based on the [unproved but functionally unchallenged] U.S. assertion that Iraq does have viable WMD programs. If Iraq actually declares viable WMD programs, it similarly proves the U.S. claim of continuing breach of resolution 687.”

Jennings: “According to this paragraph, any false statement by any Iraqi official, or any statement interpreted as false, whether false or not, could become a pretext for war.”

OP5 Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC’s or IAEA’s choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;

Bennis: “The effect of moving scientists and their families outside of Iraq would be to have UN arms inspectors acting as asylum officers. Certainly many, perhaps most scientists would jump at the opportunity right now to leave Iraq with their families and be granted asylum somewhere else. They are living, after all, in a country not only devastated by 12 years of crippling economic sanctions and the ravages of a repressive political regime, but also facing the likely possibility of imminent war. There are certainly legitimate reasons why many Iraqi scientists would want to live and work somewhere with greater safety and political freedom. There is also, however, the consequent and understandable likelihood of scientists exaggerating the level of Iraq’s military or WMD programs as well as their own role in those programs, in the hope of persuading international immigration officials of their importance. And finally, another longer term result of such an effort, if carried out on a large scale, will be the stripping of a key component of Iraq’s national intellectual and scientific base, with seriously deleterious effects on future efforts to rebuild a modern society.”

Jennings: “Enforced capture and transport of Iraqi citizens and their families ‘in the mode or location of UNMOVIC’s or IAEA’s choice,’ meaning if necessary without their consent, as in the Afghan War’s Guantanamo Bay detention camp, violates both the Geneva Conventions [] and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights []. The U.S. is bound by treaty to uphold these agreements as part of its international obligations.”

Majahan: “Depriving Iraq of its scientifically and technically-trained people is what this amounts to — once they have been seized, removed from the country, and debriefed, they will not feel safe in Iraq. Iraq has already suffered massive ‘brain drain’ since the Gulf War — the four million expatriates are disproportionately educated and technical people. It has had a ‘lost decade’ in terms of education as well – the sanctions are responsible for the fact that Iraq, unlike any other country in the world, actually experienced a decrease in literacy in the 1990’s. Any more and Iraq’s ability to redevelop and reconstruct may be impaired for another generation.”

OP6 Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq;

Bennis: “This letter asserts a set of arrangements allegedly agreed to by Iraq, without confirmation from Iraq that it did indeed accept those arrangements.”

OP7 Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in paragraph 3 above and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Security Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq notwithstanding prior understandings, to facilitate their work in Iraq:

Bennis: “In general, sidelining existing resolutions and agreements made between Iraq and the United Nations undermines the legitimacy, consistency and coherence of UN resolutions.”

Jennings: “By the provisions of paragraph 7, the U.S. and Britain want to set aside prior Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq in order to add new and more stringent demands in this new resolution. Meanwhile, the ‘great powers’ that dominate the Security Council chose to continue to ignore resolutions against Israel that continue to be unenforced. The entire resolution, but especially this paragraph, is not so much about inspections…. … Several sections of paragraph 7, when closely examined, amount to the military occupation of Iraq.”

-UNMOVIC and IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams in such a way as to ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available, and all UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities corresponding to those of experts on mission.

Mahajan: “The restrictions on UNMOVIC personnel put in place by Security Council Resolution 1284 were placed because so many UNSCOM personnel were essentially employed by the intelligence agencies of the English bloc (the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and acting as their agents, illegitimately transmitting all collected data back to those governments. The clear, and obviously fair, remedy was to require participation from a much broader group of countries and to require lack of any overt links to domestic intelligence agencies of any government.”

-UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998);

Bennis: “Sidelining the existing terms of 1154 (which set special arrangements, including diplomatic accompaniment, for inspection of the eight designated ‘presidential sites’) undermines the legitimacy of UN decision-making.”

-UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs and the associated research, development and production facilities.

-Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient UN security guards:

-UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have the right to declare for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected no-fly/no-drive zones, exclusion zones, and/or ground and air transit corridors:

Bennis: “These [last] two together blur the distinction between inspection and occupation. If Washington gets its way in the Council, the resolution will require Iraq to accept unlimited numbers of UN military troops — UN blue helmets — to guard the inspectors’ facilities. Since there is no mandate yet specified for the UN guards, that could mean armed forces prepared to use their weapons against any Iraqi — official or otherwise — who so much as blinks. There is no history of UNSCOM inspectors at their bases or centers being threatened in the past; the need for armed guards there has no clear basis. There is no clarity here what ‘UN security guards’ means; will the U.S. be satisfied with normal UN blue helmet security personnel, perhaps seconded to Iraq from their positions as security guards at UN headquarters in New York? Or will Washington use this language to demand more heavily armed military personnel, perhaps seconded not from other UN posts but from member states, ostensibly operating under UN authority? Although the earlier draft’s reference to ‘member states’ providing troops to enforce the no-fly/no-drive zones was deleted from this most recent draft, it is not clear that the U.S. has completely given up on including national military forces — presumably including U.S. troops.

“Even without a direct authorization for national armies to participate, the resolution calls for what amounts to a functional occupation of Iraq by UN military forces. Authorizing the UN inspection agencies to declare ‘no-fly/no-drive’ zones will allow them to control potentially huge swathes of Iraqi territory. Creation of ‘no-fly/no-drive’ zones itself reflects the U.S. history of taking control of large parts of Iraqi air space, and consequently Iraqi land, through the unilateral creation of ‘no-fly’ zones in northern and southern Iraq. These existing zones, imposed by the U.S. and the British (France briefly participated, then backed out), have no basis in international law; they are not authorized, or even mentioned, in any UN resolution. Inclusion in this new resolution would impose a UN imprimatur on a continuing violation of UN resolutions — particularly the references to other countries respecting Iraq’s territorial integrity.”

Paul: “The resolution contains thin legal cover for a U.S. unilateral war, so that Washington can claim authorization by the UN Security Council even if most Council members insist that a second resolution will be required. It also contains ‘booby traps’ that were in the earlier draft — language that would be unacceptable to Iraq and that would, even if accepted, lead to rapid provocation. Notice that there are still to be ‘no-fly/no-drive zones, exclusion zones, and/or ground and air transit corridors,’ etc. It will be a piece of cake for Washington to go to war on this basis and everyone understands this around the UN. But governments want deniability more than peace, so they are moving closer to agreeing to Washington’s language.”

-UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed and rotary winged aircraft, including unmanned reconnaissance vehicles:

-UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof:

-UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage; and

Bennis: “While some may believe it is implicit, this section does not identify ‘weapons material’ or some such standard to judge what may be ‘taken’ and ‘exported.’ The clear language, as written, would allow inspectors to seize and ‘export’ anything they come across in the course of doing inspections — trucks, computers, carpets — whether or not it has anything to do with prohibited materials or prohibited WMD or missile programs.”

-UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have access to any information that any member state is willing to provide;

Bennis: “This implies that national intelligence agencies will provide information to UNMOVIC or IAEA without expecting reciprocity. If indeed information goes one way — into UNMOVIC but not out of it — there is no problem. But if ordinary exchange understandings take hold, UNMOVIC or IAEA inspectors may find themselves in the position of UNSCOM inspectors during the last round — in which they are providing intelligence data back to national intelligence agencies which have no legitimate basis to receive such information. During the UNSCOM years intelligence information was provided to both U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies — including data that had no relevance to disarming Iraq’s WMD programs but had major relevance to stated U.S. goals of hostile ‘regime change’ in Iraq. It remains unclear whether any national intelligence agencies — especially that of the U.S. — would provide information to UNMOVIC inspectors without requiring reciprocal access to what UNMOVIC finds. Given the terms of Article 10 (below), it is highly unlikely that the U.S. in particular would not attempt to gain access to UNMOVIC’s information.”

Mahajan: “The numerous provisions above add up to an attempt to provide for a military occupation without having to fight a war. Note especially the right to create ‘exclusion zones and/or ground and air transit corridors.’ An earlier draft explicitly stated that these could be enforced by the military of ‘member states,’ meaning the U.S. military. That language has been removed, but the United States likes to maintain a certain ‘creative ambiguity’ — if the language doesn’t explicitly forbid enforcement by member states, they will likely claim that it allows such enforcement. In toto, these conditions amount to unrestricted military to any site it deems fit, unrestricted overflight rights, right to commandeer and control the entire electromagnetic spectrum over Iraq, unrestricted right to appropriate materials, and especially unrestricted right to occupy areas and completely control access and transit. This is remarkably like the demands the United States made of Yugoslavia in the draft Rambouillet accords (‘negotiations’ broke down shortly before the U.S. started bombing) and to the demands that the United States made of the Taliban before the Afghanistan war. In each case, the United States calls for the target country to completely relinquish its sovereignty, allowing an indefinite, roving military occupation. Since no sovereign state grants such rights, the clear inference is that the U.S. deliberately sets its demands so high they cannot be met and then claims that it has justification for war. In this case, Hussein has made some remarkable concessions and it’s not clear just how far he will go — what is clear is that no matter how much he concedes, the Bush administration will continue to refuse to take ‘yes’ for an answer.”[Demands in this resolution have been compared to demands placed upon Yugoslavia at Rambouillet,,]

OP8 Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Security Council resolution;

Bennis: “This language is aimed at demanding Iraqi compliance with the U.S.-British air patrols and bombings going on in the so-called ‘no-fly’ zones. Neither creation or military enforcement of those zones was ever authorized by the United Nations; no UN resolution before this one ever even mentioned ‘no-fly’ zones. This section would serve to legitimize the eleven-year-long illegal U.S.-British imposition of ‘no-fly’ zones, and the four-year-long illegal bombing raids carried out there. The U.S. claims that those bombing raids, and the imposition of the zones themselves, are to ‘enforce’ UN resolutions — specifically 688, which calls on Iraq to protect the human rights of various communities. But in fact the bombing is without any actual UN authorization. So far the Security Council has never called the U.S. and Britain to account for their illegal actions; this language serves to legalize those actions instead. While not specifying what would constitute ‘any member state taking action to uphold any Security Council resolution,’ it clearly demands that Iraq allow any action — including illegal military actions — that the U.S. or another country CLAIM is designed to enforce a resolution. It also denies the reality that not all Council resolutions may be enforced with military force at all, even if the Council itself makes the decision. Only resolutions specifically passed under the terms of Chapter VII can lead to the use of force. Resolution 688 was not passed under Chapter VII; quite the contrary, it reaffirms ‘the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq.'”

OP9 Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution and decides that within seven days following such notification, Iraq shall state its acceptance;

Bennis: “Because there is no specified consequence here for a potential Iraqi delay, it is likely the U.S. will interpret this section as authorizing immediate and unilateral military force. No such force would be appropriate, but there is a history of usurpation of such language.”

OP10 Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and IAEA;

Bennis: “This implies that UNMOVIC must share its actual findings and raw data with ‘the Council,’ meaning intelligence operatives from Council member states, including those pledged to overthrow the Iraqi regime (such as the U.S.). When UNMOVIC was created, its director made clear that his view of intelligence sharing was that it could only be ‘one way’ — meaning member states could provide UNMOVIC with information to assist their inspection work, but UNMOVIC would not provide reciprocity to national intelligence agencies. That would, he rightly recognized, repeat the disaster of UNSCOM’s unauthorized sharing of intelligence material with U.S. intelligence agencies. Calling here for UNMOVIC to report ‘the results’ of its interviews and data to the Council indicates a clear U.S. intention to gain access to UNMOVIC and IAEA data.”

OP11 Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;

OP12 Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraph 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to restore international peace and security;

Bennis: “This clear language should prohibit any country — including the United States — from acting unilaterally in response to any perceived Iraqi obstruction. However, given Bush administration officials’ consistent claim that they need ‘no further’ UN resolutions to authorize the use of force ‘to enforce’ UN resolutions, it is highly doubtful that Washington intends to adhere to this language. The inclusion of the reference ‘in order to restore international peace and security’ is a code for proceeding immediately to using force, whether or not authorized by a new ‘consideration of the situation.’ It is certain the Bush administration will point to this reference if they choose to go to war without actual Council consent. The fact that they specifically do not call for an actual formal meeting of the Council, and do not call for a new resolution or new decision, but only the informal call ‘to convene’ implies a lack of seriousness about the right of the Council alone to determine sufficiency of compliance and possible consequences.”

OP13 Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Bennis: “This is a fundamental point of principle — it means that the issue of Iraqi requirements and Iraqi compliance remains on the Security Council’s agenda, and only the Council itself can make decisions as to future interpretation or enforcement.”

Majahan: “The final paragraphs make it unequivocally clear that this resolution would not give the United States the right of unilateral military action. In the past, the U.S. has claimed that UNSCR 688, which calls on states to help in humanitarian efforts to aid ‘minority’ groups in Iraq (the Shia are actually a majority) and is not a Chapter VII resolution (i.e. cannot authorize use of force), authorized it to create the ‘no-fly zones’ and carry out its regular bombing attacks in the course of enforcing those zones. Once again, it’s likely that the U.S. will claim this resolution does provide authorization for war, and it will be important to point out that it does not.”

Francis Boyle, professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law: “The Bush administration has designed this resolution to be unacceptable to Iraq, knowing full well that its rejection would provide international legal window-dressing for a war of aggression in order to seize and steal their oil fields []. There is no way any self-respecting Member State of the United Nations Organization could accept this Resolution. Rather, the United Nations Charter … mandates negotiations in good faith with Iraq in order to resolve the dispute over inspections. While Bush has said that he will not negotiate with Iraq, the UN Charter [] (Article 33) [] states that ‘The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.'”

Click here for an analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 as adopted by the Security Council